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The IDEA Eligibility Mess
Mark C. Weber*
Abstract
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) guarantees
students with disabilities a free public education appropriate to their needs, but
students must meet the definition of “child with a disability” to be eligible for that
entitlement. The law governing special education eligibility, however, is
charitably characterized as a mess.
There are several sources of the current eligibility confusion. First, recent
court cases have reached conflicting conclusions about how much adverse
educational impact the child’s disabling condition must have, what constitutes a
sufficient need for special education, and when children with emotional
disabilities are eligible. Second, long-established methods for assessing learning
disabilities have withered under criticism from educational experts, and a new
method of approaching learning disabilities, response-to-intervention, is being
touted by the United States Department of Education. Nevertheless, that
innovation remains largely unproven and may be impossible to implement at
scale. Third, Congress and others have focused long-overdue attention on the
disproportionate percentage of African-Americans who are found eligible for
special education under the disability categories of mental retardation and
emotional disturbance, but neither Congress nor anyone else appears to have a
promising idea about how to address the situation.
This Article analyzes and critiques the recent cases, describes and
comments on the new learning disability assessment methodology, and evaluates
competing ideas about how to respond to ethnic disproportion. It concludes that
the solution to the entire set of problems is not a redefinition of special education
eligibility under IDEA, but rather a renewed attention to the actual terms of the
statute and the goal of full educational opportunity. This step will promote what
might be called “not-quite-so-special education,” that is, an entitlement for a
broad class of children to high quality special education supports provided in the
regular educational environment.
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INTRODUCTION
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,1 usually known as IDEA,
guarantees students with disabilities a free public education appropriate to their
needs,2 but students must first meet the definition of “child with a disability.”3
IDEA controversies are a prominent source of federal court business,4 and have
generated four Supreme Court decisions since 2005.5 Many difficult issues with
the statute’s interpretation have been resolved,6 and others have developed into
clear splits of authority,7 but few areas are so thoroughly unsettled, with so few
guideposts, as eligibility for special education services under the statute.

1

20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1482 (West 2008). For ease of reference in light of the multitude of recent
changes in the statutory provisions cited in this Article, the West unofficial United States Code
Annotated, rather than the official United States Code will be used throughout.
2
20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1412(a)(1).
3
20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401(3).
4
Analysis of the results of a Westlaw search reveals the United States Courts of Appeals issued 56
opinions in special education disputes in 2007. Law schools are only beginning to appreciate the
importance of special education law. See Perry Zirkel, Education Law Course Offerings in Law
Schools, 33 J.L. & EDUC. 327, 333 (2004) (reporting results of survey of 123 law school dean
respondents) (“[A] general education law course is offered in the clear majority of the law schools,
whereas special education law and higher education law are each offered in slightly less than a
quarter of the law schools.”); Jim Gerl, Why No SpEd Law Classes in Law Schools? (Jan. 18,
2008),
http://specialeducationlawblog.blogspot.com/search?updated-max=2008-0221T15%3A59%3A00-05%3A00&max-results=7 (noting offering of course at DePaul); see also
postings of mjstowe, anonymous, and nick to
https://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=1691205078500083881&postID=42984397808237
62853 (Jan. 20-Feb. 26, 2008) (discussing Special Education Law courses in law schools at
Kansas, Southern California, and Pepperdine, among others).
5
Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F., 128 S. Ct. 1 (2007); Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct.
1994 (2007); Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006); Schaffer v.
Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005).
6
For example, the Supreme Court has ruled that hearing officers and courts may award
reimbursement to parents who purchase educational services for their children who have been
denied an appropriate education by the public schools, Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter,
510 U.S. 7 (1993), although an unresolved controversy exists over whether the child must
previously have been enrolled in public school for the remedy to apply, see Bd. of Educ. v. Tom
F., 128 S. Ct. 1 (2007) (affirming reimbursement award by equally divided Court). Parents may
sue pro se in actions under IDEA. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 128 S. Ct. 1 (2007).
Prevailing parents are not entitled to obtain expert witness fees as part of an attorneys’ fees award.
Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006). The burden of
persuasion falls on the party, typically the parent, challenging the appropriateness of an
educational program rather than on the school proposing the program. Schaffer v. Weast, 546
U.S. 49 (2005).
7
Compare Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 2006) (awarding reimbursement to
parent of child never enrolled in public school) with Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d
150 (1st Cir. 2004) (denying reimbursement). Compare Weixel v. Bd. of Educ., 287 F.3d 138 (2d
Cir. 2002) (allowing damages claim under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2008) for violation of
IDEA) with A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 341 F.3d 234 (3d Cir. 2007) (disallowing claim).
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In a word, IDEA eligibility is a mess. There are several sources of the
eligibility confusion. First, a set of recent court cases has reached conflicting
conclusions about how much adverse educational impact the child’s disabling
condition must have, what constitutes a sufficient need for special education, and
when children with emotional disabilities are eligible. Second, educational
authorities have grown disillusioned with long-established methods for evaluating
learning disabilities. The United States Department of Education is promoting a
new method of identifying learning disabilities, response-to-intervention, but that
innovation remains unproven and looks to be extremely difficult to implement on
across disabilities and age ranges. Third, Congress and others have focused
renewed attention on the disproportionate percentage of African-Americans who
are placed in special education under the disability categories of mental
retardation and emotional disturbance. Nevertheless, no consensus has emerged
on how to address that condition.
Legal scholars have recently devoted a great deal of attention to special
education eligibility. Some work, notably that of Professor Garda, stresses the
need to read the terms of IDEA’s eligibility provisions rigidly, so as to exclude
students whose educational needs might be met by anything other than special
education as precisely defined.8 He would apply state law definitions in some
instances to narrow the eligibility standard.9 Other work, notably that of
Professor Hensel, stresses the need to interpret the terms of the IDEA eligibility
provisions more loosely, so as to guarantee assistance to children with mild and
moderate disabilities who can succeed in the mainstream of public education,
rather than restricting IDEA eligibility to children with the most severe
impairments who can be served only in restrictive placements.10 Still other work,
notably that of Professors Weithorn and Perlin, points out that strict readings of
statutory eligibility terms keep many of the children who most need educational
help from obtaining an entitlement to it under IDEA.11

8

See Robert A. Garda, Jr., Who Is Eligible Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Improvement Act?, 35 J.L. & EDUC. 291, 332 (2006). Professor Garda, however, rejects many of
the most restrictive judicial and administrative rulings concerning special education eligibility, and
reads several of the statutory terms more broadly than some courts have done. See, e.g., id. at
306, 315.
9
See Robert A. Garda, Jr., Untangling Eligibility Requirements Under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 69 MO. L. REV. 441, 497-98 (2004).
10
See Wendy F. Hensel, Sharing the Short Bus: Eligibility and Identity Under the IDEA, 58
HASTINGS L.J. 1147, 1152 (2007).
11
See Lois A. Weithorn, Envisioning Second-Order Change in America’s Responses to Troubled
and Troublesome Youth, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1305, 1357 (2005); Michael L. Perlin, “Simplify
You, Classify You”: Stigma Stereotypes and Civil Rights in Disability Classification Systems
(Apr. 23, 2007), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=982226. Professors Weithorn
and Perlin address numerous other issues touching on special education eligibility in the works
cited.
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This Article builds on the analytical framework of Professor Garda and the
insights of Professors Hensel, Weithorn, and Perlin, but observes that the
contemporary controversies over eligibility have aspects that find insufficient
discussion anywhere in the legal literature: recent cases that restrict eligibility on
flimsy grounds, new assessment and service methodologies, and pressing needs of
populations that are being ill-served by both general and special education.12 The
Article analyzes and critiques the cases, describes and comments on the
assessment methodologies for learning disabilities, and evaluates competing ideas
about ethnic disproportion in identification for special education. It concludes
that the way out of the entire set of problems is not a redefinition of special
education eligibility under IDEA, but rather a renewed attention by courts and
educational policy makers to the actual terms of the statute and its underlying
purposes. The statute supports an entitlement to special education services for a
broad class of students, but the quality of services needs to be improved and
greater effort needs to be made to provide these services in the regular education
environment.
Part I of this Article describes the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act. Part II discusses eligibility of students for services under the Act, noting the
statutory terms, the reasons the provisions are there, and the prospect that
eligibility might decline as a source of controversy. Part III tries to untangle the
components of the current IDEA eligibility mess: irrational court decisions,
challenges to existing evaluation methodology for students with learning
disabilities and the educational system’s response, and the persistent problem of
overrepresentation of African-Americans in some disability categories. Part IV
develops some proposed solutions to IDEA eligibility problems, specifically
reforms of the caselaw, recommendations regarding implementation of evaluation
methodology, and improvements in special education to decrease any harm
resulting from minority overrepresentation. The reforms suggested here are
modest, and represent restoration of the letter and spirit of IDEA rather than its
transformation, but they should provide a way to solve the problems posed by
current approaches to IDEA eligibility.

I. THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act requires states that receive
federal special education funding to provide all children with disabilities a free,

12

The work of Professor Garda is a notable exception to this generalization about inadequately
served populations and special education eligibility. See Robert A. Garda, Jr., The New IDEA:
Shifting Educational Paradigms to Achieve Racial Equality in Special Education, 56 ALA. L. REV.
1071 (2005). As indicated below, the prescriptions advanced here differ significantly from those
of Professor Garda. See infra text accompanying notes 295-312. A number of other sources
discussing the particular problems of minorities in special education will be discussed passim.
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appropriate public education.13 Participating states and their local school districts
must furnish an appropriate education to all children with disabilities, and also
must provide services related to education, such as transportation, physical and
occupational therapy, sign language interpretation, and school health services.14
The law requires that children with disabilities are to be educated, to the
maximum extent appropriate, with children who do not have disabilities, and that
school districts have to afford the children supplementary aids and services to
avoid any need for removal from regular classes.15
Parents of children with disabilities have rights to notice and consent and,
most critically, rights to participate in the creation of the individualized education
program that sets out the services to be delivered to the child.16 The parents may
challenge the program or placement by demanding an adversarial “due process
hearing” and they or the school district may appeal the result of the hearing to
court, which may hear additional evidence in order to decide the case.17 The
guarantee to each child with a disability of the right to a free, appropriate
education, and the guarantee to parents of procedural rights were key features of
the 1975 Education for All Handicapped Children Act; they demonstrate a
“congressional emphasis” on furnishing individual participation rights that would
be exercised to enforce the law’s underlying obligations.18 Two federal cases that
strongly influenced Congress in its drafting of the law upheld procedural due
process claims against exclusion from public school and equal protection claims
against denial of services to children with disabilities in public schools 19
Parents of children with disabilities spent years organizing and courting
allies to secure passage of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act.20
Although some states and local school districts had long given services to children
with disabilities and received limited federal special education reimbursement, as

13

See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1411(i) (West 2008) (authorizing appropriations). All states, the District of
Columbia, and the outlying areas participate, as does the federal government’s Bureau of Indian
Affairs.
14
See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(26) (defining “related services”).
15
20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(5).
16
See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d) (requiring opportunity for parental participation in devising
individualized education program).
17
20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(f)-(i). States may create a hearing review procedure that must be exhausted
before the matter goes to court. § 1415(g). The child remains in the existing placement during the
pendency of proceedings. § 1415(j). Attorneys’ fees are available to parents if they are
successful. § 1415(i)(3)(B)-(F). The law also provides rights to challenge long-term suspensions,
expulsions, or other removals from school imposed on children with disabilities. § 1415(k).
18
See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 476 U.S. 176, 205-206 (1982).
19
Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children
(P.A.R.C.) v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
The Supreme Court commented on the importance of these cases to the formation of the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act in Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192-93.
20
See ROBERTA WEINER & MAGGIE HUME, . . . AND EDUCATION FOR ALL 14-21 (2d ed. 1987)
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of 1975 approximately 1.75 million children with disabilities were excluded from
public school and 2.5 million were in programs that did not meet their needs.21 In
1990, Congress renamed the Education for All Handicapped Children Act the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, and that is the name the law has
today.22 The most recent amendments are the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Improvement Act of 2004,23 often referred to as the “2004
Reauthorization.”

II. ELIGIBILITY UNDER IDEA
The topic of eligibility under the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act embraces the questions of what the statutory provisions are and how they
work. Understanding eligibility law also entails discussion of why the eligibility
provisions are there in the first place and what direction, if any, they might be
expected to go in the future. For reasons to be explained, the provisions
themselves are surprisingly complex, but there is some justification for their
existence, even their complexity. Various long-term trends might be expected to
diminish the importance of the eligibility provisions, but other recent
developments have instead created what will be described as the IDEA eligibility
mess.
A. What Constitutes Eligibility Under IDEA?
Children with disabilities are eligible for services under the Act if they
meet age standards,24 have a condition listed in the statute, and by reason of the
condition, need special education and related services. The conditions set forth in
IDEA are:

21

H.R. REP. NO. 94-332, at 11-12 (1975).
Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990). The term “handicapped” had become disfavored,
and many in the disabilities rights movement favored placing the noun “person” or “individual”
first and the “with disabilities” modifier later, in order to emphasize that a person with a disability
is a human being rather than a manifestation of an impairment. See Illinois Attorney General,
Disability Rights: Manual of Style for Depicting People with Disabilities,
http://www.ag.state.il.us/rights/manualstyle.html (visited Aug. 4, 2008).
23
Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1482
(West 2008)). See generally Mark C. Weber, Reflections on the New Individuals with Disabilities
Education Improvement Act, 58 FLA. L. REV. 7, 27 (2006) (describing and commenting on 2004
Reauthorization).
24
Generally speaking, the age range is three through twenty-one. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(1)(B)
(West 2008). Children within the age range lose coverage if they have received a regular high
school diploma. 34 C.F.R. § 300.101(a)(3)(i) (2008). Children who are in adult prisons are also
subject to possible exclusion. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii). See generally Paul M. Secunda, Mediating the
Special Education Front Lines in Mississippi, 76 UMKC L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (describing
first-hand experience of mediating special education dispute in state detention facility for children
adjudicated as adults).
22
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mental retardation, hearing impairments (including deafness),
speech or language impairments, visual impairments (including
blindness), serious emotional disturbance (referred to . . . as
“emotional disturbance”), orthopedic impairments, autism,
traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific
learning disabilities25
The statute defines some of these terms. For example, a specific learning
disability is “a disorder in 1 or more of the basic psychological processes involved
in understanding or in using language, spoken or written, which disorder may
manifest itself in the imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or
do mathematical calculations,” including “such conditions as perceptual
disabilities, brain injury, minimal brain dysfunction, dyslexia, and developmental
aphasia.”26 The federal regulations provide further definitions of the listed
conditions.27 That a child has a listed condition is not the sole criterion for
eligibility for services under the Act. The child must by reason of the condition
need special education and related services.28
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 also affect eligibility for education adapted to the
needs of children who have disabilities by providing these children with
protection from disability discrimination. The persons covered under the two
laws are those who have a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
a major life activity, or a record of such an impairment, or are regarded as having
such an impairment.29 Duties under section 504 and the ADA include the
obligation not to segregate nor to deny equal opportunity,30 as well as the
requirements to accommodate and to provide a free, appropriate public
education.31 These duties apply to units of state and local government (under
ADA title II), such as public schools, and entities that receive federal funding
(under section 504), including all public and some private schools.32

25

20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)(A). A child aged three through nine may be eligible on the basis of
having “developmental delays, as defined by the state and as measured by appropriate diagnostic
instruments and procedures, in one or more of the following areas: physical development;
cognitive development; communication development; social or emotional development; or
adaptive development . . . .” § 1401(3)(B) .
26
20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(30)(A)-(B).
27
34 C.F.R. § 300.8.
28
20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)(A)(ii).
29
29 U.S.C.A. § 705(20)(B) (West 2008); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2) (West 2008); see 34 C.F.R. §
104.3(j) (2008). Section 504 is found at 29 U.S.C.A. § 794; title II of the ADA, which covers
state and local government, including public schools, is found at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12131-12150.
30
See 34 C.F.R. § 104.4(b)(ii) (opportunity to participate), (iv) (segregate) (2008)
31
See 34 C.F.R. § 104.33 (requiring provision of free, appropriate public education).
32
For a discussion of the interplay between the ADA and section 504, see Mark C. Weber,
Disability Discrimination by State and Local Government: The Relationship Between Section 504
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B. Why Identify Children as Eligible?
The earliest federal efforts to assist the education of persons with
disabilities included definitions of which children were eligible for services,33 and
these provisions conformed to understandings of disability that were current
among education professionals at the time.34 The drafters of the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975—the direct ancestor of IDEA—followed the
practice of using diagnostic labels for eligibility.35 One authoritative source
reports that use of categorizing labels had come under attack by the time Congress
considered the Act, but explains that the advocates who lobbied for the law were
organized by various disability groups, such as groups concerned with blindness,
deafness, physical disabilities, and so on.36 Most of these groups were more
preoccupied with obtaining services by use of the disability label than they were
with any stigma the label might carry.37 The advocacy groups acted in a grand
of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 36 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1089 (1995).
33
See Pub. L. No. 93-380 § 101(a)(2)(E), 88 Stat. 491 (1974) (“A state agency which is directly
responsible for providing free public education for handicapped children (including mentally
retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually handicapped, seriously emotionally
disturbed, crippled, or other health impaired children who by reason thereof require special
education), shall be eligible to receive a grant under this section for any fiscal year.”) (repealed
1978); Pub. L. No. 91-230 § 602(1), 84 Stat. 175 (1970) (“The term ‘handicapped children’ means
mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually handicapped, seriously
emotionally disturbed, crippled, or other health impaired children who by reason thereof require
special education and related services” ) (repealed 2004); Pub. L. No. 89-750 § 161, 80 Stat. 1204
(1966) (“As used in this title, the term ‘handicapped children’ includes mentally retarded, hard of
hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed, crippled, or
other health impaired children who by reason thereof require special education and related
services.”) (repealed 1970). State and local provisions also employed categorical definitions. See
Rudolf V. Womack, A Survey of Relevant Problems in Administering a Program of Special
Education for the Cook County Argo-Evergreen Park, Reavis, Oak Lawn Special Education
District 15-27 (June, 1969) (unpublished master’s thesis, DePaul University) (on file with
Richardson Library, DePaul University) (describing categories then employed by state board of
education and local school district pursuant to state law).
34
Professional sources display what from the present remove seems a near-obsession with
definition and categorization. See EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN IN THE SCHOOLS 8 (Lloyd M. Dunn
ed., 2d ed. 1973) (“By 1950, 12 types of exceptional children had been delineated: (1) gifted, (2)
educable mentally retarded, (3) trainable mentally retarded, (4) emotionally disturbed, (5) socially
maladjusted, (6) speech impaired, (7) deaf, (8) hard of hearing, (9) blind, (10) partially seeing,
(11) crippled, and (12) chronic health cases.”); ROMAINE P. MACKIE, SPECIAL EDUCATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: STATISTICS 1948-1966 (1969) (reporting statistics on children served in special
education by disability category); Womack, supra note 33. One prominent author traces this
attitude to the movement at the beginning of the twentieth century to make schools more
businesslike and the development of standardized testing during the same period. David L. Kirp,
Schools as Sorters: The Constitutional and Policy Implications of Student Classification, 121 U.
PA. L. REV. 705, 714-15 (1973).
35
Pub. L. 94-142 § 4 , 89 Stat. 775 (1975) (repealed 2004).
36
Leslie E. Ward & Virginia Abernethy, Background, Enactment, and Implementation of P.L. 94142, PEABODY J. EDUC., Summer, 1983, at 1, 10-11.
37
Id. at 11
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coalition, which muted the voices of some advocates for persons with mental
retardation about the disadvantages of labeling.38 Reasons for an eligibility
standard, specifically one that employs medical-diagnostic categories, include
funding allocation, imposition of limits on costs, and possible connections
between diagnoses and methods of instruction.
1. Allocating Resources. The first and most obvious reason to define the
class of children with disabilities for purposes of federal and state law is so that
members of Congress can be certain the amounts they are appropriating for
special education will actually serve children with disabilities rather than be lost
in the much larger general education efforts of the districts that receive the
money.39 The original grant of federal funding for special education, after
defining “handicapped children” covered under the law, required grantees to
submit state plans, and warned:
The plan must provide satisfactory assurance that funds paid to the
State under this title will be expended, either directly or through
local educational agencies, solely to initiate, expand, or improve
programs and projects, including preschool programs and projects,
. . . which are designed to meet the special educational and related
needs of handicapped children throughout the State . . . .40
The law also contained a nonsupplanting provision, by which states had to
guarantee that the federal funds would supplement, and in no instance supplant,
state, local and private expenditures for the education of the children defined in
the statute.41 Provisions restricting expenditures to educational services for
children with disabilities and prohibiting supplanting continue to this day.42
In keeping with these provisions, the funding formula under the Education
of All Handicapped Children Act allocated money to states based on their count
of children with disabilities being provided special education and related

38

Id.
Criticism may be made of existing accountability structures despite the legal requirement that
money must be spent only on eligible children. See Jeri D. Barclay, Fiscal Accountability Under
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: How Do We Ensure the Money Is Spent on
Handicapped Children and Related Services?, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 327, 329 (1999) (“Because there
are, in general, no accountability procedures in place for overseeing and checking the expenditures
of school systems, it is possible that the money designated for handicapped students is often spent
on other ‘more important’ things, like football goal posts, new lockers, televisions, and bonuses
for school board members.”).
40
Pub. L. No. 89-750 § 161, 80 Stat. 1205 (1966) (repealed 1970).
41
Pub. L. No. 89-750 § 161, 80 Stat. 1206 (1966) (repealed 1970).
42
See 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1412(a)(18) (West 2008) (prohibiting state-level supplanting of
expenditures); 1413(a)(2)(a) (restricting local school district use of funding and prohibiting locallevel supplanting of expenditures).
39

© 2008. Unpublished Manuscript—All Rights Reserved.

10

IDEA ELIGIBILITY

services.43 The current formula for distribution, adopted in the 1997 IDEA
Amendments, uses that amount for the state’s baseline, but allocates increases in
funding since 1999 on a formula that relies on the number of children (not the
number of children with disabilities) aged three through twenty-one if the state
guarantees free, appropriate public education to children with disabilities of those
ages, with a boost for the state’s relative population of children in poverty.44 The
amounts are to be passed through to local school districts under the pre-1997 Act
children-with-disabilities-count baseline, with increases since 1999 allocated on
the school-aged population of the district, again with a supplement for relative
population of children in poverty.45 Effectively, the count of children with
disabilities was frozen, and increases in funding tied to increases in the general
population of school-aged children and the prevalence of poverty in the state.
Under the current version of IDEA, a given child need not actually receive a
specific disability category label in order to be given federally funded special
education services, but states must report children by disability category for
statistical purposes and the child must be a child with a disability under the

43

Pub. L. No. 94-142 § 5(a), 89 Stat. 776 (1975) (repealed 2004).
20 U.S.C.A. § 1411(d)(2)-(3). Other language pertaining to the additional funding guarantees
against grant decreases and establishes maximum and minimum grants. § 1411(d)(3)(B). The
contingency of decreased federal funding is also addressed. § 1411(d)(4). A limit on the count of
children for federal special education funding to no more than 12% of the school-aged population
in the state was repealed when Congress changed the funding formula. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1411(a)(5)
(West 1996) (repealed 1997).
45
20 U.S.C.A. § 1411(f)(2) (West 2008). Evidence suggesting that child disability category
counts are inconsistent among states led the Department of Education to press for this change. See
Revision of Special Education Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Early Childhood,
Youth and Families of the H. Comm. on Education and the Workforce, 105th Cong., 1997 WL
42634 (Feb. 4, 1997) (statement of Thomas R. Bloom, Inspector General, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.)
(“Representatives from all ten of the independent organizations with whom we spoke corroborated
our conclusion that the states differed significantly in the proportion of children they counted in
the various disability categories.”). The sponsors of the 1997 legislation made the change to
eliminate incentives for identifying children with disabilities without sufficient justification. H.
REP. NO. 105-95, at 88 (1997) (“The Committee developed the change in [funding] formula to
address the problem of over-identification of children with disabilities.”).
44
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statute.46 Many states continue to use the count of children with disabilities47 in
distributing state special education funding.48
2. Limiting IDEA Costs. A second reason to define children with
disabilities and limit funded services to that class is to set an outside limit on costs
borne by the federal and state governments. The use of the category of children
with disabilities as an eligibility criterion operates to limit the number of children
who can claim entitlement to a free, appropriate public education and thus
contribute to that cost. Without some limit on the number of such children, the
maximum financial exposure for educating children with disabilities would be
infinity. Because of the federal funding formula changes in the 1997 IDEA
Amendments, the eligibility standards that limit the number of children deemed to
be children with disabilities are a decreasingly significant federal cost control,49
but past application of the standards constitutes the baseline for allocation of most
of the federal funding and so continues to exert budgetary force.50 Moreover,

46

See Marcia C. Arceneaux, The System and Label of Special Education: Is It a Constitutional
Issue?, 32 S.U. L. REV. 225, 239 (2005) (“Federal law mandates that a child must qualify for
special education services, thereby receiving this broad label, before receiving the second
‘descriptive category’ label (e.g., mildly mentally disabled). The descriptive categorical label is
not a mandate by law. However, in practice, the categorical labeling is commonly used within the
special education system for national consistency of data.”); see also 20 U.S.C.A. § 1418(a)(1)(A)
(reporting requirements).
47
Some states use proxies for the count of identified children. These proxies include weighting
formulas that allocate set amounts for the assumed extra cost of educating each child in a given
disability category, as well as resource-based models, which allocate funding based on teacher and
related service personnel count. See generally THOMAS PARRISH ET AL., 1 STATE SPECIAL
EDUCATION FINANCE SYSTEMS, 1999-2000, at 3-11 (2003) (describing set types of state financing
systems and compiling survey data on their prevalence).
48
See Thomas Parrish, Disparities in the Identification, Funding, and Provision of Special
Education, in RACIAL INEQUITY IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 15, 18 (Daniel J. Losen & Gary Orfield,
eds. 2002) (“[M]ost . . . states have more generic systems providing funding based on the number
of students receiving special education services or on general enrollment.”); id at 29 (identifying
24 of 28 surveyed states as linking funding for local school districts to counts of children with
disabilities being served by district).
49
Moreover, the federal financial exposure is restricted by the statute and capped by
appropriations. The maximum federal funding that may be awarded under IDEA is 40% of the
average cost of educating a child without disabilities for each child receiving special education.
20 U.S.C.A. § 1411(a)(2) (West 2008). Congress has never actually appropriated enough funds to
provide support for states and school districts at the maximum level under IDEA. Instead,
allocations are ratably reduced to meet appropriations. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1411(d)(2)-(3). The federal
participation varies from year to year, but it tends to range just above 10%. See Revision of
Special Education Programs, supra note 45, at 1997 WL 42635 (statement of George W. Severns,
Ph.D.). The definitional limit on which children may be claimed for the maximum amount of
funding in the statute keeps the gap between aspiration and reality from being limitless. Full
funding, i.e., funding to the maximum amount, is a perennial hope of many special education
advocates and their congressional allies. See, e.g., S. 2185, 109th Cong. (2006) (IDEA Full
Funding Act); H.R. 1107 (2005) (Full Funding for IDEA Now Act).
50
One authority testifying regarding the 1997 legislation opposed relaxing the standards for the
category of developmental delay on the ground that it would raise the child count and increase
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definitional limits on children’s eligibility control allocations of state and local
dollars based on child count.51
3. Creating Instructional Categories. Reason number three has to do with
instruction. Identification, specifically identification by category, traditionally
has been thought to be needed in order to determine what services should be
provided to children.52 Doubts have emerged concerning this link between
identification and instruction, with the result that more and more educators
question the value of rigid disability-category classification.53 It remains true,
however, that much support for special education legislation comes from
professional and parental groups that are organized by disability category or
services associated with a particular type of disability.54 The support for specific
categorical definition may thus survive its demonstrated educational value.55
C. A Diminishing Role for Special Education Eligibility?
The limited, and to some degree diminishing, value of the reasons for
insisting on eligibility by disability classification dovetails with the reforms in
special education law over the past dozen years. The absence of a clear link to
instruction and the removal of a direct tie between eligible-child count and federal
funding might be expected to cause a further deemphasis on the eligibility issue.
That expectation is in turn reinforced by amendments to IDEA in 1997 and 2004,
costs. Revision of Special Education Programs, supra note 45, at 1997 WL 42639 (statement of
Lou Barela).
51
See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
52
See S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 27 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425,1451
(“[I]dentification and labelling of . . . handicapping conditions . . . is a necessary tool for designing
appropriate instruction.”); LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 93 (1990) (“It is
necessary to identify children who have special needs and to identify what type of programming is
appropriate.”).
53
See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Sch. Psychologists, NASP Position Statement on Rights Without Labels
(revised statement adopted July 14, 2002),
http://www.nasponline.org/about_nasp/positionpapers/rwl.pdf (visited Aug. 4, 2008) (“Contrary to
commonly held assumptions, research indicates that . . . [p]articularly among the more subjective,
‘mild’ disability categories of Specific Learning Disability, Mental Retardation, Emotional
Disturbance, and Speech/Language Impairment, labeled students show significant overlap in skills
and receive highly similar instruction.”).
54
See H. REP. NO. 108-77, at 78-80 (2003) (listing witnesses for various congressional proposals
to amend IDEA from 2001-03). It should be noted, however, that a large number of witnesses in
support of recent legislation have been academic experts, school district officials, and leaders of
cross-disability organizations. Cf. Ward & Abernethy, supra note 36, at 10-11 (noting high degree
of disability-category affiliation of supporters of 1975 special education legislation).
55
See Sharon Weitzman Soltman & Donald R. Moore, Ending Segregation of Chicago’s Students
with Disabilities: Implications of the Corey H. Lawsuit, in RACIAL INEQUITY IN SPECIAL
EDUCATION, supra note 48, at 239, 250 (noting opposition to change by proponents of existing
Illinois system of special education “tightly organized around specific disability categories based
on the view that disabilities could be identified with precision and that each disability could best
be ‘treated’ by a specialist in that disability working solely with students who ‘had’ that particular
disability.”).
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as well as a greater orientation towards disability accommodations in other laws.
Even the accountability movement in general education has blurred the line
between children eligible for special education and other children by causing
children not designated as IDEA-eligible to receive specialized instruction to
boost test scores and supplemental educational services to compensate for
attending underperforming schools.
The 1997 IDEA Amendments took a major step toward reducing reliance
on disability categories by taking the category of “experiencing developmental
delays,” which had previously been used only for pre-schoolers, and permitting it
to be used for children all the way up through age nine.56 The term is defined
broadly to include delays in physical development, cognitive development,
communication development, social or emotional development, or adaptive
development.57 Effectively, the law allows a child up through age nine to be
identified as disabled without any specification of the child’s disability.58
The 2004 Reauthorization makes a number of changes that affect special
education eligibility and may decrease its significance. The new law allows a
school district to use up to 15% of its federal special education funding for early
intervening services for children who have not been formally identified as
needing special education but who nevertheless need additional academic and
behavioral support to succeed in the general education environment.59 Congress
adopted this provision in response to the view of the members of the President’s
Commission on Excellence in Special Education and others who believed that
waiting to determine eligibility before providing educational assistance amounts
to waiting for children to fail and unnecessarily segregates children with
disabilities from the general education population.60 Significantly, under this law
federal special education funding directly benefits students who have never
been—and, if the program is successful, perhaps never will be—identified as
students with disabilities. The 2004 Reauthorization also provides that state
educational agencies must permit school districts to use methods for determining
a learning disability other than the discrepancy between a student’s intellectual
ability and achievement.61 This change responds to criticism of IQ testing, and
may reflect doubts over the meaningfulness of the learning disabilities designation
both in itself and in distinction from other categories of disability that have a

56

Pub. L. No. 105-17, § 602, 111 Stat. 42 (1997) (codified at 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)(B) (West
2008)).
57
20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)(B)(i).
58
This reality led to opposition on the ground that too many children might obtain the
classification and thus an entitlement to services. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
59
20 U.S.C.A. § 1413(f).
60
PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON EXCELLENCE IN SPECIAL EDUCATION, A NEW ERA: REVITALIZING
SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES 7 (2002).
61
20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(b)(6)(A) (West 2008).
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negative impact on the learning process.62 The federal regulations provide that
states must permit districts to use a process for determining learning disability that
is based on the child’s response to scientific, research-based intervention.63
As noted above with regard to eligibility standards in general, the federal
special education law operates against the background of a separate law barring
disability discrimination in all federally funded activity, section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.64 Another law, the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 reinforces the nondiscrimination duty for school districts and other units of
state and local government.65 Under these statutes, children who have a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity must receive
reasonable accommodations from public school systems.66 Although the vast
majority of these children will also be eligible under IDEA, some may obtain
services as accommodations without ever going through the special education
eligibility process, and still others might be found ineligible under IDEA because
they do not meet the specifics of an IDEA eligibility category or do not need
special education and related services despite their disabling conditions.67 The
practice of providing limited accommodations and failing to give fuller special
education services to some of these children has caused conflicts,68 but the
availability of the services under non-IDEA auspices may decrease the need to
find children IDEA-eligible in certain cases.
In reality, specialized educational services for public school children are
by no means a monopoly of the special education system. The accountability
standards embodied in the student achievement goals of the No Child Left Behind
(NCLB) initiative contemplate significantly enhanced services to children who

62

See Weber, supra note 23, at 27 (collecting sources). See generally infra text accompanying
notes 194-97 (exploring criticisms of learning disability designation).
63
34 C.F.R. § 300.307(a)(2) (2008). The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the regulations
contains language critical of the discrepancy-based model for learning disabilities determinations
and praises the RTI alternative. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 70 Fed. Reg. 35,802 (June 21,
2005).
64
29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 2008).
65
See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12131-12150 (West 2008) (covering state and local government services).
See generally (discussing relationship between section 504 and ADA).
66
29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 2008), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132 (West 2008). These laws cover
individuals whose condition meets the definition described in the text, as well as those with a
record of such an impairment and those regarded as having such an impairment. 29 U.S.C.A. §
705(20)(B) (definition applicable to section 504), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2) (definition applicable
to ADA title II).
67
See MARK C. WEBER, RALPH MAWDSLEY & SARAH REDFIELD, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 59 (2d ed. 2007). An example would be a child with an orthopedic
impairment who has completed the high school physical education requirement.
68
Compare Hood v. Encinitas Union Sch. Dist., 486 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming denial of
IDEA eligibility for child receiving accommodations under section 504) with Mr. I. v. Me. Sch.
Admin. Dist. No. 55, 480 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007) (overturning denial of IDEA eligibility for child
afforded services under section 504).
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are at risk of low achievement so that they rise up to performance levels set by the
state.69 Children in schools that are failing to make adequate yearly progress must
be offered supplemental educational services—essentially, tutoring—from
providers other than their public schools.70 Title I remedial educational services
are available to children in schools with high numbers or high percentages of
impoverished students, and nearly fifteen million students receive assistance
under this program.71 States and school districts must cooperate with the NCLB
program or they will lose title I funding.72
The confluence of all these developments could result in what I have
elsewhere termed “not-quite-so-special education.”73 In the current context, that
would mean large numbers of children receiving the specialized services and
accommodations they need under any number of different programs, without
much emphasis on the label of the child or the name of the program, but with
careful attention to the goal of having all children thrive in the mainstream of

69

See generally No Child Left Behind Act, Pub. L. No. 107-10, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified at
20 U.S.C.A. §§ 6301-6320, 7801-7803 (West 2008)); Perry Zirkel, NCLB: What Does It Mean for
Students with Disabilities, 185 Ed. L. Rep. (West) 805 (2004) (outlining NCLB collective goals
for achievement by students). Some commentators are highly negative about NCLB, see, e.g.,
Thomas Rentschler, No Child Left Behind: Admirable Goals, Disastrous Outcomes, 12 WIDENER
L. REV. 637 (2006), but others are at least guardedly optimistic, see, e.g., Chester E. Finn, 5 Myths
About No Child Left Behind, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2008, at B03, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/28/AR2008032802976.html;
Weber, supra note 23, at 20-21, 51. The ultimate effect of NCLB on IDEA eligibility remains
unpredictable, but there is some reason to believe that, for better or worse, it may diminish the
number of children in special education. If successful, the NCLB program may lead to
improvements in general education that decrease the need for children to be served by the special
education system. Unfortunately, NCLB may also lead to school officials artificially limiting the
number of children in special education so that their testing results are not viewed as statistically
significant. See id. at 20 & n.76 (collecting sources); see also Richard C. Herrera, Note, Policing
State Testing Under No Child Left Behind: Encouraging Students with Disabilities to Blow the
Whistle on Unscrupulous Educators, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1433 (2007) (discussing various forms of
educator misconduct with regard to testing of students with disabilities).
70
20 U.S.C.A. § 6316(e) (West 2008) . See generally Policy and Program Studies Service, U.S.
Dep’t of Educ., Report Highlights: Early Implementation of Supplemental Educational Services
under the No Child Left Behind Act (2002),
http://www.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/disadv/supplementalyear1/highlights.pdf (visited Aug. 4, 2008).
71
See 20 U.S.C.A. § 6301 (statement of purpose); U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Fact Sheet on Title I, Part
A (August 2002), http://www.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/disadv/title1-factsheet.pdf (visited Aug. 4,
2008) (providing statistical information on title I program). See generally Stephanie Stullich et al.,
National Assessment of Title I Final Report (2007), available at
http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/pdf/20084012_rev.pdf (discussing title I program’s longitudinal impact).
72
See 20 U.S.C.A. § 6311 (establishing conditions for funding). The impact of this use of the
spending power on federalism concerns has received scholarly attention. E.g., Rentschler, supra
note 69, at 639-53 (noting federalism-based objections to NCLB); Note, No Child Left Behind and
the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 885, 897-900 (2006) (discussing
constitutional concerns with regard to funding conditions in NCLB).
73
Weber, supra note 23, at 51.
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public education.74 But instead, conflicts have emerged as school districts try to
keep children from attaining the eligibility status for IDEA, a status that, unlike
being served under section 504, NCLB, or title I, gives the children clear rights to
appropriate education and gives their parents explicit procedural protections to
enforce those rights. These eligibility conflicts are the first part—but only one
part—of the IDEA eligibility mess.

III. THE IDEA ELIGIBILITY MESS
A certain amount of disorder may always be present in legal regimes that
address complex social problems.75 But even within the all-too-arcane field of
special education law, the topic of IDEA eligibility is messy indeed. The reasons
for that condition, and the components of the current confusion over special
education eligibility are three: a series of recent cases, many oddly and
indefensibly restricting children’s IDEA eligibility; a longstanding dissatisfaction
with methods of evaluating children for learning disabilities, matched by a notfully-proven but hard-sold methodological response; and a well-founded concern
over racial overrepresentation in some IDEA eligibility categories, met with
anxiety over what to do about it.
A. Recent Contested Cases, Many Irrationally Restricting Eligibility
Some of the current problems with special education eligibility stem from
judicial decisions that read the eligibility provisions extremely narrowly. A
number of these cases divide up the provisions and then use caselaw relating to a
different topic, the proper level of special education services, or use state law, in
order to give the terms restrictive readings. Other cases rely on an oddly worded
regulation supposedly distinguishing social maladjustment from emotional
disturbance to exclude children with behavior disorders from eligibility under
IDEA. The approaches taken in these decisions have scant justification but
significant effects in muddying the eligibility waters.
74

Other observers detected convergence between general education and special education as early
as the late 1980s and early 1990s. See James A. Tucker & Jeffrey F. Champagne, Where’s the
War? A Response to Meredith and Underwood, 25 J.L. & EDUC. 447, 448 (1996) (“[T]here has
been a steady movement toward the integration of special-education philosophy into the regular
classrooms of America.”); see also id. at 451 (“As the field struggles toward reform for all
students, terms such as inclusiveness and individualization are not just for special education any
more. For reasons having little to do with disabilities, schools are experimenting with outcomebased and outcome-paced progressions that do not presume the existence of a mainstream.”).
Some sources note a potential for greater convergence but believe it has not yet been fulfilled. See
Arceneaux, supra note 46, at 245-46 (proposing that services for all children be provided within
single system of education); Nat’l Ass’n of Sch. Psychologists, supra note 53, at 6 (proposing
“noncategorical models of service delivery”).
75
For an interesting discussion of this topic in connection with law regarding civil procedure, see
Janice Toran, ’Tis a Gift to be Simple: Aesthetics and Procedural Reform, 89 MICH. L. REV. 352
(1990).
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1. Cases Parsing the Eligibility Provisions, Misusing the Rowley Case,
and Relying on State Law. The eligibility provisions in the federal law can be
broken down into three components.76 First, there has to be one of the specified
disabling conditions;77 second, for all of these but specific learning disabilities,
which appears to have the term implied, there must be an adverse effect on
educational performance;78 and third, the child, by reason of the disabling
condition, must need special education and related services.79 What appears to be
most newsworthy in recent decisions applying these eligibility provisions is the
courts’ strict parsing of them, the use of Board of Education v. Rowley80 in
interpreting one or all of the terms, and the application of state law to questions
about the terms’ interpretation.
A recent opinion applying these approaches to the case of a child with
learning disabilities81 is Hood v. Encinitas Union School District.82 Hood
involved a fifth-grader who had average to above average grades and test scores,
but who also had serious problems completing her work on time, keeping her
belongings organized, and finishing tasks.83 The child’s test scores showed
occasional poor performance but high intellectual ability.84 There was also
evidence of a visual impairment and a seizure disorder, and a recommendation for
evaluation for attention-deficit disorder, which led to the child’s taking
medication for the condition.85 The public school provided an accommodation
plan that included preferential seating, use of a graphic organizer and keyboard,
one-step directions, visual support for instructions and concepts, frequent prompts
for understanding, and daily teacher checks on homework assignments.86 The
hearing officer agreed with the school district that the child was not eligible under

76

Garda, supra note 9, at 457-58.
20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (West 2008). Children aged three through nine with developmental
delays are treated somewhat differently See 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(b) (2008).
78
34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(1)-(13).
79
20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)(A)(ii).
80
458 U.S. 176 (1982).
81
The empirical research of Professor Zirkel suggests that relatively few special education
disputes hinge on eligibility under the heading of specific learning disability, and that school
districts prevail in the overwhelming majority of the cases, typically by showing that the
discrepancy between ability and achievement is not severe enough. PERRY A. ZIRKEL, THE LEGAL
MEANING OF SPECIFIC LEARNING DISABILITY FOR SPECIAL EDUCATION ELIGIBILITY 69-70 (2006).
The small number of cases contrasts with their mighty impact on the confusion over IDEA
eligibility. For a thoughtful discussion of Professor Zirkel’s study, see Paul M. Secunda, “At Best
an Inexact Science”: Delimiting the Legal Contours of Specific Learning Disability Under IDEA,
36 J.L. & EDUC. 155 (2007).
82
486 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2007).
83
Id. at 1101.
84
Id. The child’s scores on achievement tests put her above the median almost uniformly. Id.
85
Id. at 1101-02.
86
Id. at 1102.
77
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IDEA, and the district court affirmed, relying on a state law providing that
discrepancies in performance matter only if they cannot be corrected through
other regular or categorical services offered within the regular instructional
program.87
The court of appeals affirmed, again relying on the state law about
discrepancies not being able to be corrected through services offered within
regular education.88 The court tried to buttress its position with a discussion of
Board of Education v. Rowley, the first case the Supreme Court decided under the
statute that became the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, in which the
Court declared that the Act was satisfied if the school system provided
“personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to
benefit educationally;” the Act did not require that the child’s potential be
maximized.89 At first, the Hood court conceded that Rowley concerned the level
of required services to be provided a child found to be eligible, not the
determination of eligibility itself.90 After pushing the Rowley case out the front
door, however, the court invited it in the back. It asserted that, “Just as courts
look to the ability of a disabled child to benefit from the services provided to
determine if that child is receiving an adequate special education, it is appropriate
for courts to determine if a child classified as non-disabled is receiving adequate
accommodations in the general classroom—and thus is not entitled to special
education services—using the benefit standard.”91 The court said that under the
some-benefit standard of Rowley and cases like it, the child’s nearly uniform
record of average or above average grades showed that she was disqualified from
eligibility as a child with a learning disability under the state provision because
the discrepancy between achievement and performance appeared correctible in
the regular classroom.92 The court thus (1) read a Supreme Court case concerning
levels of services to (2) place a restrictive construction on state law dealing with
commensurateness of achievement with ability, when the state law itself (3)
limited the federal definition of learning disability by requiring that the condition
not be able to be corrected within the regular classroom.93 Not one of these steps
has a justification in the federal statute.

87

Id. at 1103 (citing CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56337(c) (West 2003)).
Id. at 1106.
89
458 U.S. 176, 203 (1982).
90
Hood v. Encinitas Union Sch. Dist., 486 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2007) (“While it is true that
the Rowley case dealt with the level of services that must be provided to a student already deemed
eligible for special education, rather than special education eligibility itself . . . .”).
91
Id. at 1107.
92
Id. at 1108.
93
The court also rejected the contention that the child was a child with a disability under the
category of other health impairment (OHI), saying that the child did not need special education
when accommodations could be provided in the regular classroom, relying again on a state law
provision. Id. at 1108 (citing CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56026(b) (West 2003)).

88
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Another court of appeals case similar in its breakdown of the eligibility
provisions and use of Rowley (if not in its reliance on state law provisions) is
Alvin Independent School District v. A.D.94 The case concerned a child with
attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) who was dismissed from special
education after third grade and performed well through elementary school, but
then began exhibiting behavior problems in middle school.95 He was placed in an
“at-risk” program, but continued to pass all his classes and meet statewide
achievement standards.96 His misconduct escalated to the point that in eighth
grade he engaged in theft of property and robbery of a school concession stand,
for which he was given an in-school suspension and a recommendation for
placement in an alternative education program.97 The child nevertheless had
satisfactory grades, with one A, three Bs, two Cs, and one D, and passed the state
achievement test, doing particularly well in reading.98 The district court
overturned a hearing officer decision that the child was eligible for special
education, reasoning that the child did not need special education services by
reason of his disability, and the court of appeals affirmed.99
The court of appeals agreed with the child’s parents that ADHD is
included in the IDEA eligibility category of other health impairment (OHI), but
ruled that the child failed to meet the second half that the IDEA eligibility
standard, that “by reason thereof, [the child] needs special education and related
services.”100 The court noted that the child had passing grades and success on
state evaluations. It quoted language from Rowley stating that the achievement of
passing grades is an important factor in determining educational benefit, without
noting that Rowley was referring to the level of services for a child already found
eligible rather than any part of the eligibility standard. The court also said that the
child’s teachers testified that despite his misconduct he did not need special
education and had social success in school;101 it noted that there were nonADHD-related reasons for the misconduct, including the recent death of the
student’s baby brother and the student’s abuse of alcohol.102 The court said that
any educational need was not by reason of the ADHD.103

94

503 F.3d 378 (5th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 379-80.
96
Id. at 380.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 381.
100
20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)(A) (West 2008).
101
Given the unfortunate social dynamics that often appear in middle school, one may wonder
whether the aggressive misconduct may have raised the child’s social prestige.
102
Alvin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. A.D., 503 F.3d 378, 384 (5th Cir. 2007).
103
Id. A recent district court case with some similarities to Hood and A.D. is Ashli C. v. Hawaii,
No. 05-00429 HG-KSC, 2007 WL 247761 (D. Haw. Jan. 23, 2007), in which the court affirmed an
administrative decision that a child with ADHD receiving differentiated instruction available to all
children in the classroom failed to meet the IDEA eligibility standard because her condition did
95
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Not every recent case has been so restrictive in its approach to eligibility.
In Mr. I. v. Maine School Administrative District No. 55, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a child with Asperger’s Syndrome and depression was a child
with a disability under IDEA.104 The court reached its result by steering clear of
Rowley, though it could not avoid the specifics of the federal eligibility provisions
and state law definitions. Mr. I. concerned a child who regularly missed school,
engaged in self-destructive behavior, and had trouble with peer relationships.105
Nevertheless, she had a history of adequate to superior academic performance.106
Psychological testing suggested the presence of Asperger’s Syndrome and
adjustment disorder with depressed mood.107 The school deemed the child
eligible under section 504 and provided her a plan that furnished tutoring and
social pragmatics instruction.108 Over the parents’ objections, the school system
refused to find her eligible under IDEA, so the parents continued a placement they
had initiated for her in a private school after she had made a suicide attempt; they
demanded tuition reimbursement from the school district.109 The hearing officer
upheld the school district’s conclusion that the child was not eligible under IDEA,
but the district court reversed that holding.110
The court of appeals affirmed the ruling that the child was eligible.111 The
Asperger’s Syndrome and mood disorder met the list of conditions in the statute,
leaving in dispute the adverse effect on educational performance and the need for
special education by reason of the condition.112 The court observed that Maine
law defined educational performance to include “academic areas (reading, math,
communication, etc.), non-academic areas (daily life activities, mobility, etc.),
extracurricular activities, progress in meeting goals established for the general
curriculum, and performance on State-wide and local assessments.”113 The court
rejected the school district’s contention that educational performance includes
simply the academic areas measured and assessed by the state or school district,
not meet the component of the OHI definition that the condition adversely affect educational
performance. The court looked to Rowley and said that any adverse effect did not render the child
unable to learn and perform in regular classroom without specially designed instruction. Id. at 910.
104
480 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007).
105
Id. at 6.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 7.
108
Id. at 8.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 9.
111
Id. at 23. It also affirmed a holding by the district court that the parents were not entitled to
tuition reimbursement, because the private school they chose did not provide special education
services, nor was the child entitled to compensatory education, because the district court in its
discretion believed that prospective relief would be a sufficient remedy for past harm. Id. at 2326.
112
Id. at 19. Precisely which statutory condition applied did not need to be resolved. Id.
113
Id. at 11 (quoting 05-071-101 ME. CODE. R. § 2.7 (Weil 2006)).
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and it buttressed that reading with reference to the broad purposes of IDEA to
prepare children with disabilities for independence and meet children’s social as
well as academic needs.114
The court also pointed out that the requirement of “adversely affects
educational performance” in the federal regulations includes any adverse effect,
even if slight. Relying on legislative history, the dictionary, and other sources,
the court rejected arguments by the school district for a reading of the term that
would require a significant adverse impact.115 It distinguished J.D. v. Pawlet
School District,116 a Second Circuit case, on the ground that in concluding the
child was not eligible for special education the Second Circuit relied on a
Vermont regulation that defined adverse effect to require a determination that the
child was functioning significantly below expected age or grade norms in one or
more areas of basic skills.117 Finally, the court rejected the school district’s
argument that the child did not need special education by reason of her condition,
stressing that both the federal and state law definitions of special education
included the social skills and pragmatic language instruction the child needed.118
The school district took a confusing position on the child’s meaning of the term
“need,” at one point arguing that need related to benefit in the areas of educational
performance affected by the disability and at another that need related to the
ability to do well in or benefit from school. The court pointed out that a child
may not need special education to do well in school in the sense of getting high
grades, but may still perform below acceptable levels in areas such as behavior. It
did not resolve the precise meaning of the term, but found the school district’s
arguments unsupported with regard to the principal point about benefit in the
areas of educational performance adversely affected by the child’s condition.119
2. Social Maladjustment Cases. A topic of slightly less prominence in
recent caselaw but still a matter of importance for special education eligibility is
whether a child’s condition fits within the category of severe emotional
disturbance, or is classed instead as mere social maladjustment and not included
in the categorical definition. “Serious emotional disturbance” is one of the
conditions that may qualify a child as a child with disability under IDEA,120 and

114

Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 13-16. The court rejected a floodgates argument, saying that a child would be excluded if
she did not need special education by reason of the condition, or might be excluded by the
disability conditions’ definitions without reaching that question. Id. at 13-14.
116
224 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2000).
117
Mr. I. v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 55, 480 F.3d 1, 16-17 (1st Cir. 2007).
118
Id. at 20-21.
119
Id. at 21-23.
120
20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (West 2008). The statutory text notes that serious emotional
disturbance is “referred to in this title as ‘emotional disturbance.’” Id. The terms will be used
interchangeably here. The Supreme Court has pointed out the historical practice of excluding
children with emotional disturbance from public school, and the importance of the federal special
115
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the definition of serious emotional disturbance in paragraph 300.8(c)(4)(i) of the
federal regulations covers long-term conditions that are exhibited “to a marked
degree” and adversely affect the child’s educational performance.121 These
conditions include the “inability to learn that cannot be explained by intellectual,
sensory or health factors,” the “inability to build or maintain satisfactory
interpersonal relationships with peers and teachers,” “inappropriate behavior or
feelings under normal circumstances,” “a general, pervasive mood of unhappiness
or depression,” or “a tendency to develop physical symptoms or fears associated
with school problems.”122 After reciting this list, however, the regulation states:
“Emotional disturbance includes schizophrenia. The term does not apply to
children who are socially maladjusted, unless it is determined that they have an
emotional disturbance under paragraph (c)(4)(i) this section.”123
The original meaning of this “socially maladjusted” language is
mysterious.124 A leading special education source from the time of the drafting of
the 1975 Education for All Handicapped Children Act and the original edition of
the regulations notes that “emotionally disturbed” and “socially maladjusted” are
often used interchangeably, then goes on to say, “The term ‘socially maladjusted’
is a less noxious synonym for ‘juvenile delinquent.’ Its usage is usually restricted
to adolescents or preadolescents who break the law and thus has a legal
derivation.”125 The inference is that the language about social maladjustment was

education law in covering these children. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 324 (1988) (“In drafting
the law, Congress was largely guided by the recent decisions in Mills v. Board of Education of
District of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 ([D.D.C.] 1972), and PARC [v. Pennsylvania], 343 F.
Supp. 279 ([E.D. Pa.] 1972), both of which involved the exclusion of hard-to-handle disabled
students. Mills in particular demonstrated the extent to which schools used disciplinary measures
to bar children from the classroom. There, school officials had labeled four of the seven minor
plaintiffs “behavioral problems,” and had excluded them from classes without providing any
alternative education to them or any notice to their parents. . . . Congress attacked such
exclusionary practices in a variety of ways. It required participating States to educate all disabled
children, regardless of the severity of their disabilities, . . . and included within the definition of
“handicapped” those children with serious emotional disturbances.”).
121
34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(4)(i) (2008).
122
34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(4)(i)(A)-(E).
123
34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(4)(ii).
124
See Weithorn, supra note 11, at 1357 (“Neither term was a diagnostic ‘term of art’ in the
mental health or education fields prior to their use in the legislation and regulations, and studies
have revealed that those applying the definition do not apply the term in a systematic or consistent
matter from setting to setting or case to case.”); Moira O’Neill, Note, Delinquent or Disabled?
Harmonizing the IDEA Definition of “Emotional Disturbance” with the Educational Needs of
Incarcerated Youth, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1189, 1203 (2006) (collecting sources indicating identical
usage of terms “socially maladjusted” and “emotionally disturbed” in materials surrounding
enactment of early federal special education legislation). A now-repealed Connecticut special
education statute combined the terms, providing a definition for the category “socially and
emotionally maladjusted” children. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-76a(i) (1985) (repealed 1996).
125
Paul S. Graubard, Children with Behavior Disabilities, in EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN IN THE
SCHOOLS, supra note 34, at 243, 245. The Model Penal Code Contains a parallel provision in its
language concerning the insanity defense:
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inserted simply to keep every child who is classified as delinquent from being
automatically eligible for special education. That interpretation is reinforced by
the structure of the regulation itself. The child may meet the criteria for
emotional disturbance and be socially maladjusted, in which case the child is
eligible. It is only if the child fails to meet the criteria of paragraph (c)(4)(i) that
he or she will not qualify as having emotional disturbance. Social maladjustment
is thus not an exception or exclusion from the category of emotional
disturbance,126 it is simply not a basis for emotional disturbance if it stands alone.
A number of courts interpret the social maladjustment term as a broad
exclusion, however. An illustrative decision is Tracy v. Beaufort County Board of
Education, in which a child with asthma and other breathing difficulties engaged
in drug and alcohol abuse, was truant from school, and manifested depression.127
The school district found the child eligible for IDEA services under the other
health impaired category, but the parent argued that he was also emotionally
disturbed, and thus that the school district should pay for a private placement they
undertook to address the emotional difficulties he was experiencing.128 The court
affirmed a state review officer’s decision that the child was not eligible under the
emotional disturbance category, declaring: “During the time that Sean was
enrolled in public school, he engaged in unruly conduct, such as alcohol and drug
abuse, but there was no indication that this conduct was the result of anything
other than social maladjustment.”129 The court thus read social maladjustment as
a condition in itself, a disability category distinct from emotional disturbance.
The court did go on to discuss whether the child met the qualifying characteristics
of paragraph (c)(4)(i) and ultimately concluded that he did not, and that emotional
disturbance did not cause an adverse effect on his education.130 Although the
latter considerations indicate that the court would have reached the same result
had it read the regulation’s language about social maladjustment correctly, the
treatment of social maladjustment as something distinct from emotional
disturbance is troubling.
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms “mental disease or defect” do not include
an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial
conduct.
Model Penal Code § 4.01 (2001). Thanks to Michael Perlin for this insight.
126
Thus it makes more sense to speak of the “‘socially maladjusted’ exclusionary language” than
the social maladjustment exclusion. See O’Neill, supra note 124 (using “exclusionary language”
terminology).
127
335 F. Supp. 2d 675 (D.S.C. 2004).
128
See id. at 688. As noted above, there is no necessary connection between the eligibility
category under which the child qualifies and the services the child is entitled to receive, but the
parties and the court operated under the assumption that there was.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 689.
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Tracy is a lineal descendent of Springer v. Fairfax County School Board,
which it relied on and quoted at length.131 In Springer, a child who had been
successful in school developed behavior problems in eleventh grade.132 He was
convicted of possession of burglary tools and tampering with a car, stayed out all
night, stole from his parents and others, and used marijuana and alcohol.133 His
offenses at school included absenteeism, driving recklessly on school property,
forgery, leaving school grounds without permission, fighting, and stealing another
student’s car.134 His absenteeism, failure to complete assignments, and failure to
show up for final exams caused him to fail three of seven courses for the year.135
His parents enrolled him in a private residential school and requested public
school funding on the ground that he was a child with emotional disturbance and
needed the placement to learn.136 The school contended that his behavior
manifested a conduct disorder, but not emotional disturbance.137 Although a local
hearing officer ruled that the child was IDEA-eligible as emotionally disturbed, a
state review officer reversed and the district court affirmed that ruling.138
The court of appeals affirmed, stating that the child was socially
maladjusted, defined as engaging in “continued behavior outside acceptable
norms.”139 The court relied on the child’s consistent diagnoses of conduct
disorder, which it found to be consistent with social maladjustment.140 It then
asserted that “the regulatory framework under IDEA pointedly carves out
‘socially maladjusted’ behavior from the definition of serious emotional
disturbance.”141 It continued: “This exclusion makes perfect sense when one
considers the population targeted by the statute. Teenagers, for instance, can be a
wild and unruly bunch. Adolescence is, almost by definition, a time of social
maladjustment for many people.”142 Equating bad conduct with serious emotional
disturbance would include too many children in special education and increase the
schools’ burdens accordingly.143 The court went on to state that “finding that
Edward was socially maladjusted does not end the inquiry. The regulations
contemplate that a student may be socially maladjusted and suffer an independent

131

134 F.3d 659 (4th Cir. 1998); see Tracy, 335 F. Supp. 2d at 688-89 (quoting Springer).
Springer, 134 F.3d at 661.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id. at 661-62.
138
Id. at 662.
139
Id. at 664 (quoting local hearing officer decision).
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id.
132
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serious emotional disturbance that would qualify him for special education
services . . . .”144 The court concluded that he did not, discussing the
considerations in the regulation.145
The portion of the court’s reasoning that gave an independent meaning to
social maladjustment, equating it with a diagnosis of conduct disorder and
viewing it as an exclusion from the category of emotional disturbance, is contrary
to the regulation’s language and its clear intent. The court removed conduct
disorder as a basis for emotional disturbance and required that some “independent
serious emotional disturbance” meet one of the various factors found in paragraph
(c)(4)(i). But the regulation simply provides that if one of the factors is met, the
child qualifies as emotionally disturbed. If the child is a juvenile delinquent and
none of the factors are satisfied, then the regulation excludes the child. But it is
not the social maladjustment that does the excluding; it is the failure to satisfy
paragraph (c)(4)(i). Of course, equating juvenile delinquency or mere misconduct
with emotional disturbance would include more children as special educationeligible than Congress intended. But if a conduct disorder manifests itself in one
or more of the factors the regulation sets out, it qualifies as severe emotional
disturbance whether or not one may accurately characterize it as social
maladjustment.146
Many courts apply the language about social maladjustment in a more
considered way. For example, in Independent School District No. 284 v. A.C., the
Eighth Circuit confronted the case of A.C., a fifteen-year-old girl whose conduct
in school included disruption of class, profanity, insubordination, and truancy.147
Outside of school, she used alcohol and drugs, was sexually promiscuous, ran
away from home, was suspected of forging checks, and repeatedly threatened or
attempted suicide.148 A local hearing officer and state review officer ruled that
she was eligible under IDEA and that the proper placement was a secure,
residential treatment facility.149 The district court reversed the order for

144

Id. at 664-65.
Id. at 665.
146
Other cases follow Springer’s approach. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. JD, 232 F.3d 886 (3d Cir.
2000) (unpublished) (ruling that child’s problems stemmed from social maladjustment, not
educational disability that district overlooked); Brendan K. v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., No. 054179, 2007 WL 1160377, at *11 (E.D. Penn. Apr. 16, 2007) (finding child not eligible and quoting
Springer regarding carving out social maladjustment from emotional disturbance); N.C. v.
Bedford Central School District, 473 F. Supp. 2d 532, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding child not
eligible and separating social maladjustment from emotional disturbance category). In other
contexts, courts appear reluctant to afford IDEA remedies to children whose problems manifest
themselves in delinquency. See, e.g., Dale M. v. Bd. of Educ., 237 F.3d 813, 817 (7th Cir. 2002)
(denying reimbursement for placement deemed to be “jail substitute” for child with psychological
impairment who engaged in criminal conduct).
147
258 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 2001).
148
Id. at 771.
149
Id. at 773.
145
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residential placement on the basis of emotional disturbance; it drew a distinction
between unwillingness to attend school or comply with the requirements of a
public school placement and the inability to attend school or comply with the
placement.150 The court of appeals, however, disagreed, and reversed the district
court, declaring that the proper analysis could not be “limited to a stark distinction
between unwillingness and inability to behave appropriately. There is a grey area
between normal, voluntary conduct and involuntary physiological response, and
that area is where Congress has chosen to locate behavioral problems such as
A.C.’s.”151 The court turned to the factors now in paragraph (c)(4)(i) and said,
“Read naturally and as a whole, the law and regulations identify a class of
children who are disabled only in the sense that their abnormal emotional
conditions prevent them from choosing normal responses to normal situations.”152
The child fell into that category, and the condition so identified interfered with her
learning to the point where a restrictive placement was needed.153 Another court
applied a similar approach to determine that a ninth-grade child who performed in
the 99th percentile in standardized tests but engaged in drug abuse, uncontrollable
behavior at home, poor performance at school, and truancy following his parents’
divorce proceedings met the standards for eligibility under the emotional
disturbance category.154
As Professor Weithorn observes, the regulation that includes the social
maladjustment term is problematic in that it too readily appears to separate
children who are socially maladjusted from those who are emotionally disturbed,
while it nevertheless uses criteria for emotional disturbance that include
characteristics associated with social maladjustment, such as inappropriate
behavior under normal circumstances and the inability to build or maintain
interpersonal relationships.155 Taking the regulation as it stands, however, the
problem with the judicial applications of the term, the departure from its proper
interpretation, is affording social maladjustment an independent role as an
exclusion from the emotional disturbance category and insisting that something
independent of it satisfy the emotional disturbance criteria. The regulation does
not say that, and the interpretation that it does is insupportable.
3. The Courts’ Role in the IDEA Eligibility Mess. One cannot take
exception to the general approach to eligibility taken by the courts discussed
under heading 1, above, which entails asking first to see if one of the listed
disability conditions exists; then, if the federal definition includes an adverseeffect requirement, asking about adverse effect on educational performance; and
150

Id. at 775.
Id.
152
Id. at 775-76.
153
Id. at 777-79.
154
New Paltz Cent. Sch. Dist. v. St. Pierre, 307 F. Supp. 2d 394 (N.D.N.Y. 2004).
155
Weithorn, supra note 11, at 1357. The article collects numerous sources critical of the
“socially maladjusted” language of the regulation. Id. n.223.

151
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then, if the answer to both questions is yes, asking whether as a result the child
needs special education. The statute and regulations employ a structure that
appears to demand such an approach. What is far from justified, however, is
relying on a state law definition that requires the adverse effect be “significant”
when the federal regulation features the unadorned term, or relying on state law
that defines educational performance in a crabbed way. There is also no
justification to rely on a state law definition of “needs special education” that
restricts that phrase to needing services or accommodations that cannot be
provided in the regular classroom even when the services or accommodations
provided in the regular classroom meet the ordinary meaning of the term special
education. Thus the reliance on the odd state law definition of the need for
special education in Hood v. Encinitas Union School District156 and the reliance
on a strange definition of adverse effect on educational performance in J.D. v.
Pawlet School District157 are wrong and should be rejected.
Professor Garda defends the use of state law definitions for eligibility
terms that the federal statute and regulations leave undefined, specifically
definitions of need for special education and educational performance.158 But
there is nothing in IDEA that delegates to the states the power to define the
federal statutory terms,159 and there is no reason that a child in Vermont should be
ineligible for special education when the same child would be eligible in Maine
under the identical federally supported program. Although the definition of
“appropriate” education in IDEA references state law, the definition of “child
with a disability” does not.160 The Department of Education has occasionally said
156

486 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 82-93).
224 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 116-17).
158
See, e.g., Garda, supra note 8, at 299, supra note 9, at 465-67.
159
The one limited exception to this generalization demonstrates that when a delegation is
intended, it is explicit and arises from a specific situation justifying delegation. Without giving
any other authority to the states to define the term “special education,” the federal regulations
permit states to define what would otherwise be a “related service” as “special education” if they
choose to do so. 34 C.F.R. § 300.39(a)(2)(i) (2008). This regulation responded to the situation in
the years preceding the 1975 Act, when states varied as to whether a child who required only
speech therapy or had similar needs for a very specific and limited form of intervention was be
considered eligible for special education. The federal regulators decided to permit the states to
retain their existing modes of classification on this point. States that defined these services out of
special education would not receive federal money to assist those children, but would continue to
use state resources. The original version of the regulation said that special education “includes
speech pathology, audiology, occupational therapy, and physical therapy, if the service is
considered ‘special education’ rather than a ‘related service’ under State standards.” 41 Fed. Reg.
56978 (1976) (proposed 45 C.F.R. § 121a.4). The final version merely mentioned “speech
pathology, or any other related service, if the service is considered ‘special education’ rather than
a ‘related service’ under State standards.” 45 C.F.R. § 121a.14 (1978). Neither this history nor
whatever autonomy states have over curriculum provides a basis for a states to define out of
existence the adverse effect of a child’s physical or mental condition on educational performance,
a test that is part of a clinical standard in a federal law term regarding federal statutory protection.
160
Compare 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(9)(B) (West 2008) (defining free, appropriate public education to
include meeting the standards of the state educational agency) with § 1401(3)(allowing discretion
157
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in informal statements that various terms of IDEA were open to the states to
define,161 but Congress explicitly provided in IDEA that non-regulation guidance
of this sort is not binding,162 and there is no explicit basis for it in this instance.
Considerations of federalism that may support local or state control on matters
such as curricular content or levels of educational expenditures163 are out of place
when the threshold question is who is to be served under a federally funded
program designed to address the national problem of children with disabilities
who are out of school or in inappropriate programs.164
The state law definitions at issue in cases such as Hood and J.D. are
particularly inapt because they eliminate the federal entitlements to special
education services of children by defining the children out of the coverage of the
statute Congress wrote. State law provisions that restrict entitlements established
by federal statutes are void under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.165
The Supreme Court has applied this principle in cases regarding benefit programs
in which the federal government provides funding to states on the condition they
comply with the terms of the federal program, the same arrangement that exists
for special education under IDEA. In Rosado v. Wyman, the Supreme Court ruled
that a provision of New York law that redefined a standard of need in setting
benefit amounts for federally funded welfare did not conform to the statutory
requirements of the federal statute, when those requirements were properly
interpreted.166 The new definition of need adopted by the state eliminated items
of need included before, so as to reduce benefits to families or cut them off from
assistance.167 The Court held that the state was not free to adopt a definition that
restricted benefits in a way the federal statute did not specifically authorize.168
The Court pointed out that the state was free to reject federal money and opt out
of the program, but it stressed that the proper interpretation of the federal statute
adopted by Congress was the overriding concern, and that was a job for the
judiciary, not the state administration.169 Justice Harlan, writing for the majority,
quoted Justice Cardozo: “When federal money is spent to promote the general
to states in defining eligible children only with regard to adoption of disability category of child
aged three through nine experiencing developmental delay).
161
See Garda, supra note 8, at 300 (collecting federal guidances regarding states’ ability to define
educational performance). But see Garda, supra note 9, at 465 n. 128 (noting that guidance from
the relevant federal office “is less than clear on the subject”).
162
20 U.S.C.A. § 1406(e)(1).
163
Cf. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that equal
protection does not require equality of educational expenditures among school districts in state,
citing local autonomy concerns).
164
See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(c)(2), (d) (reciting original findings about unserved children with
disabilities and noting continuing purposes of IDEA to guarantee that children have appropriate
education).
165
See U.S. CONST., Art. VI.
166
397 U.S. 397 (1970).
167
Id. at 416-17.
168
Id. at 417-18.
169
See id. at 421-22.
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welfare, the concept of welfare or the opposite is shaped by Congress, not the
states.”170
Courts have compounded the definitional problem by using the Rowley
case to support their constricted views of what it means to need special education
on account of a disability. Professor Garda rightly criticizes this “reverse
engineering” of Rowley’s interpretation of appropriate education standards into
the analysis of when a child needs special education.171 The deaf child in the
Rowley case was, of course, eligible for special education even though she was
performing as well as or better than her peers. The level of services a child is
entitled to once the child is eligible is a different topic from whether the child is
eligible in the first place, and to rely on Rowley to reach a decision on the
eligibility topic is to make a category mistake. The reality is that there exists no
precise definition for “needs special education” beyond the meaning of the words
themselves. As with so many other terms in federal law, the courts (and other
decision makers) develop a working sense of who or what falls within the
statutory term by deciding the matter case-by-case and then, after passage of time,
looking back and seeing if a definition has emerged.172 From the diversity of
caselaw results, it does not appear that a picture has yet come into focus.
Similar hypertrophied definition-making appears to be at work in the
construction of IDEA’s eligibility term for emotional disturbance. There is no
justification for giving an independent categorical meaning to “social
maladjustment” and separating it out from “emotional disturbance.” The courts
that proceed directly to the term of the regulation defining emotional disturbance
and compare the child’s characteristics—from whatever psychological or
physiological source—to the requirements in the regulation are the ones that are
interpreting the statute properly. Commentators agree that turning social
maladjustment into an exclusion undermines congressional intent and harms
children.173

170

Id. at 423 (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 645 (1937)). Many cases that overturn
state definitional restrictions on federal entitlements in federal-state cooperative programs are in
the public welfare field. See, e.g., Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971) (overturning state
definition of dependent child that excluded college students from welfare eligibility under federalstate program); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (overturning state definition of parent that
operated to exclude families from welfare eligibility under federal-state program).
171
Garda, supra note 9, at 509. Professor Garda goes on to use Rowley’s approach to support the
proposition that children passing, yet performing poorly, need special education under the statute.
Id. at 509-11.
172
Cf. Note, Enforcing the Right to an “Appropriate” Education: The Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1103 (1979) (suggesting use of commonlaw development to inform meaning of appropriate education term of statute).
173
See Weithorn, supra note 11, at 1357; O’Neill, supra note 124, at 1203-07; see also Theresa
Glennon, Disabling Ambiguities: Confronting Barriers to the Education of Students with
Emotional Disabilities, 60 TENN. L. REV. 295, 334-35 (1993) (describing social maladjustment
provision as source of confusion and underidentification of children as emotionally disturbed).
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Relying on some of the cases discussed above and quite a number of
others, Professor Hensel concludes that courts and other decision makers in IDEA
disputes are mimicking courts in ADA employment actions by excluding from
consideration individuals who do not satisfy a stereotype of the truly disabled.174
Thus they apply a severity screen that resembles the “substantially limits” a
“major life activity” term of the ADA as some courts have restrictively defined
it.175 Like the courts in ADA employment cases, they reduce the number of
individuals covered by the statute and manifest an attitude that persons with
disabilities are an irreducible “other” who are different from the nondisabled
norm in obvious and unbridgeable ways.176 Predictably, this will undermine the
basis in popular support for special education funding and promote the
demonizing of the ever-smaller class of children said to absorb resources from
general education.177 The correct approach should be just the opposite. It should
broaden the eligibility for assistance of children who need help in order to learn,
whatever the origin of their problems. Some form of eligibility determination
may be necessary for the special education system to work, but labeling should
not be emphasized, nor should the class of eligible children be artificially
narrowed.178 Special education should be a bundle of extra services available to
the many who need them rather than a place to hide the supposedly uneducable
few.179 Professor Hensel’s position has much to recommend it as an analysis of
what the courts are doing and a proposal for which direction the law should move
toward. Policy prescriptions need to be developed from these insights, but first it
is necessary to look to the other issues present in the current IDEA eligibility
controversy.

174

Hensel, supra note 10, at 1180-87.
Id. at 1184 (referring to 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(A) (West 2008)). It was entirely predictable
that this type of thinking would emerge. Many of the lawyers defending disability discrimination
actions by arguing the limited coverage of the ADA are from firms that practice school-side
special education law. School administrators who long had lawyers looking after their interests in
labor-management issues turned to the same firms for representation in special education matters
when they encountered legal disputes of this type. There is, of course, nothing sinister in any of
this, but it should be no surprise that legal approaches would migrate from one area to the other.
An additional source drawing comparisons between restrictions on special education eligibility
and narrow views about who is protected under the ADA is Nicholas L. Townsend, Framing a
Ceiling as a Floor: The Changing Definition of Learning Disabilities and the Conflicting Trends
in Legislation Affecting Learning Disabled Students, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 229, 266-67 (2007).
176
Hensel, supra note 10, at 1185.
177
Id. at 1187-96; see also Perlin, supra note 11, at 42 (discussing “sanist myths” about persons
with mental disabilities that isolate these individuals and confer stigma on them, such as the myth
that people with mental disabilities are faking their condition or simply need to try harder).
178
See Hensel, supra note 10, at 1196-97.
179
See id. at 1200 (making point in context of discussion of overidentification of children with
disabilities).
175
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B. Concerns About Learning Disabilities Identification, and the RTI Response
It is no easy task to repair a vehicle while it is moving. The previous
discussion tries to demonstrate that many caselaw interpretations of IDEA’s
eligibility terms are broken. But IDEA itself is moving on, with recent statutory
and regulatory amendments that reflect new approaches to identifying children as
eligible with regard to the largest single eligibility category, that of learning
disability. These approaches reflect a discontent with current methods of
identifying children with learning disabilities, and take the form of Response-toIntervention (RTI) methodologies. The changes contribute to the current
uncertainty about eligibility under IDEA.180
1. Discontent About Identification of Children with Learning Disabilities.
Between 1976 and 1996, the number of students identified under the category of
specific learning disabilities (SLD or LD) increased 283% to 2,259,000.181 The
number currently stands at 2,710,476, making SLD the largest disability category,
with about 45% of all IDEA-eligible children.182 This explosion in child count
may not be so remarkable. The SLD label is usually considered less stigmatizing
than mental retardation or other labels, so schools and parents may be lighting on
this category in all plausible instances.183 Problems have arisen, however,
because the growth in the category has occurred against a background of
increased criticism of intelligence testing, the traditional method used to

180

Other recent changes to IDEA may also affect eligibility determinations, but at the moment
they do not appear significant enough to warrant extended treatment. For example, the 2004
Reauthorization of IDEA demands that children with disabilities be included in state and district
assessment programs, including those for the No Child Left Behind initiative. 20 U.S.C.A. §
1412(a)(16)(A) (West 2008).
Students with disabilities need to be given appropriate
accommodations and alternative assessments when necessary and as indicated in their
individualized education programs; the state or district conducting the assessment program has to
develop guidelines for furnishing accommodations. § 1412(a)(16)(B)-(C). The alternate
assessments have to be aligned with the challenging academic content standards and achievement
standards of the state. § 1412(a)(16)(C)(ii)(I). If the state has adopted alternate achievement
standards, the alternate assessment has to measure student achievement against the standards. §
1412(a)(16)(C)(ii)(II). The proliferation of detail and the increase in emphasis regarding the
achievement testing of children with disabilities may create incentives for administrators to initiate
or resist special education identification for the children in their schools. See Weber, supra note
23, at 20-21 (collecting reports of manipulation of testing cohorts of students with disabilities).
Another change in the new law that may affect eligibility is the adoption of a default timeline (that
is, unless the state has a different one) of sixty days maximum from receipt of parental consent for
evaluation to completion of evaluation. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(a)(1)(C).
181
Frank M. Gresham, Responsiveness to Intervention: An Alternative Approach to Identification
of Learning Disabilities (2002), http://nrcld.org/resources/ldsummit/gresham4.html.
182
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Data Tables for OSEP State Reported Data,
https://www.ideadata.org/tables30th/ar_1-3.xls (visited Aug. 4, 2008). The count is as of 2006,
and includes schoolchildren ages 6 through 21.
183
See Terry Jean Seligmann, An IDEA Schools Can Use: Lessons from Special Education
Legislation, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 759, 770 & n. 67 (2001) (collecting sources; attributing rise in
SLD identification to recognition of lower stigma and to other factors).
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determine learning disability, and that reality has in turn led to criticism of the
conceptual integrity of the SLD category itself.184
Traditionally, a learning disability is diagnosed based on the presence of a
severe discrepancy between achievement and intellectual ability in one or more
areas of learning.185 IQ testing is the classic means to determine intellectual
ability.186 Critics contend that methods dependent on IQ testing magnify the
effects of IQ measurement errors and make the unjustified assumption that IQ is a
good ability measure.187 They challenge the reliability (that is, the stability from
testing session to testing session) of discrepancy measurements.188 Moreover,
they observe that there are wide variations from state to state concerning how
much discrepancy will support a conclusion that a learning disability exists.189
One researcher summarized the case he and others have made against the
discrepancy approach:
We believe that the balance of the evidence shows that the severe
discrepancy classification criteria are (a) unreliable (particularly in
the sense of stability), (b) invalid (poor readers with higher IQs do
not differ on relevant variables from those with IQs commensurate
with reading levels), (c) easily undermined in practice by giving
multiple tests, finding a score that is discrepant and ignoring
disconfirming evidence, and (d) harmful because the severe
discrepancy delays treatment from kindergarten or first grade when
the symptoms of reading disability are first manifested to 3rd or
4th grade when reading problems are more severe, intervention
more complex, and the school curriculum shifts from [learning to
read] to “reading to learn.”190
IQ-discrepancy methodology has its defenders, however,191 and there are also
some authorities who take a middle position, suggesting that both IQ-discrepancy

184

See supra note 180 (reporting criticism of standardized testing implementation).
Louise Spear-Swerling, Response to Intervention and Teacher Preparation, in EDUCATING
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES: IDEIA 2004 AND BEYOND, EDUCATING INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES: IDEIA 2004 AND BEYOND 273, 276 (Elena L. Grigorenko ed. 2008).
186
Id. at 276-77.
187
Gresham, supra note 181.
188
Jack M. Fletcher et al., Alternative Approaches to the Definition and Identification of Learning
Disabilities: Some Questions and Answers (2004),
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3809/is_200412/ai_n9471603/pg_1?tag=artBody;col1.
189
Daniel J. Reschly & John L. Hosp, State SLD Identification Policies and Practices, 27
LEARNING DISABILITIES Q. 197, 208-10 (2004).
190
Daniel J. Reschly, What If LD Changed to Reflect Research Findings? (Dec. 2003),
http://www.nrcld.org/symposium2003/reschly/reschly7.html.
191
Kenneth A. Kavale et al., The Feasibility of a Responsiveness to Intervention Approach for the
Identification of Specific Learning Disability: A Psychometric Alternative (Dec. 2003),
http://www.nrcld.org/symposium2003/kavale/kavale.pdf (“The value of discrepancy lies in its
185

© 2008. Unpublished Manuscript—All Rights Reserved.

IDEA ELIGIBILITY

33

and other means should be employed in determining the existence of learning
disability.192
Use of existing methodologies to determine the presence of LD causes
widely varying counts of LD children, with some states reporting percentages
more than three times those of other states.193 This reality, doubts about IQ
testing, and natural caution about labeling leads some writers to doubt whether a
concept of learning disability ought to exist at all.194 Other critics are willing to
posit the existence of learning disabilities, but deny that the condition should have
a role in educational decision making, much less be the basis for what the writers
perceive as preferential treatment for students who are identified as having LD.195
When it comes to leading educational researchers, however, “virtually all
authorities recognize the existence of genuine cases of LD . . . .”196 Ironically,
just as the doubts about the integrity of the LD concept are becoming part of the
popular culture, evidence is emerging that dyslexia, the best known form of
learning disability, has an organic basis that may, in time, be able to be diagnosed

ability to document the unexpected nature of the learning problem. Everything else being equal,
there was little reason to believe that the particular student would experience learning difficulties.
Since the underachievement dimension is integral to the SLD construct, it may represent a better
‘first gate to learning disabilities identification’ . . . than the proposed RTI model.”); see Jack A.
Naglieri & Alan S. Kaufman, IDEIA and Specific Learning Disabilities, in EDUCATING
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES: IDEIA 2004 AND BEYOND, supra note 185, at 165 (Elena L.
(defending specific cognitive testing and criticizing RTI).
192
Tom Scruggs, Alternatives to RTI in the Assessment of Learning Disabilities (Dec. 2003),
http://www.nrcld.org/symposium2003/scruggs/scruggs3.html (proposing that RTI operate as part
of general education and that low achievers in one or more areas demonstrate IQ-achievement
discrepancy to be considered LD).
193
Reschly, supra note 190 (“LD prevalence . . . varies by a factor of 3 times in the U.S.
(KY=2.76% vs. RI at 9.46%). Moreover, LD prevalence within states varies markedly . . . .”); see
Kavale et al., supra note 191 (“Besides over-identification, another problem is found in the very
different numbers of students with LD identified across settings. The significant variability is seen,
for example, across states where prevalence rates have been found to range from 2% to 7% . . . .
There is little rhyme or reason for these different rates, and it appears that they may primarily
reflect a lack of consistency in identification procedures . . . .”). Professor Kavale attributes the
variability to insufficiently rigorous and uniform application of discrepancy methodology, rather
than reliance on discrepancy approaches per se. Id.
194
See, e.g., Robert J. Sternberg & Elena L. Grigorenko, Identity and Equality: Which Queue?, 97
MICH. L. REV. 1928 (1999) (declaring learning disability concept invalid in practice); see also
Scruggs, supra note 192 (collecting and criticizing sources that “manifest . . . hostility to the entire
category of learning disabilities.”).
195
See MARK KELMAN & GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGAL
TREATMENT OF STUDENTS WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES (1997). For criticisms of Kelman and
Lester, see Andrew Weis, Jumping to Conclusions in “Jumping the Queue,” 51 STAN. L. REV. 183
(1998)
196
Spear-Swerling, supra note 185, at 273 (further noting that despite recognition of genuine cases
of LD, “some investigators have argued that the LD category helps to excuse schools from the
responsibility of teaching all children successfully.”).
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through methods such as magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) tests of the brain.197
It has also become clear that one common criticism of the LD concept, the charge
that rich parents buy LD diagnoses for their children in order to secure
accommodations that confer a competitive advantage in school, is an urban
legend.198 Professor Shaywitz, a leading authority on dyslexia and a well known
critic of IQ-discrepancy methodology, states, “In all my experience with scores
and scores of students, I have yet to encounter a young man or woman who
falsely claims to be dyslexic. For those who understand dyslexia and its
tremendous costs to the individual, the very idea that someone would willingly
seek such a diagnosis is absurd. . . .”199 In fact, the stigma of the label makes it
something no one would accept unless a severe underlying problem led the person
to seek help.200
Nevertheless, the fact that learning disabilities actually exist and have a
physiological basis may not be crucial for educational decision making. A
consensus is emerging that effective instruction does not depend on the results of
the psychological testing that has traditionally been used in LD diagnosis.201 And
this may mean that the controversies over testing and categorical integrity need

197

See SALLY SHAYWITZ, OVERCOMING DYSLEXIA 82, 85 (2003); Michael M. Gerber, Teachers
Are Still the Test: Limitations of Response to Instruction Strategies for Identifying Children with
Learning Disabilities (Dec. 2003),
http://www.nrcld.org/symposium2003/gerber/gerber.pdf (“There is rapidly accumulating evidence
that at least some learning disabilities—the same associated with phonological processing
deficiencies in behavioral testing—are associated with a clear . . . and modifiable . . . neurological
substrate. Therefore, . . . there is strong reason to suppose that, in principle, students displaying
this condition can be reliably identified independent of instructional trials.”); see Margaret
Semrud-Clikeman, Neuropsychological Aspects for Evaluating Learning Disabilities (Dec. 2003),
http://www.nrcld.org/symposium2003/clikeman/clikeman3.html.
Authorities discussing the
physiological basis of dyslexia are nonetheless skeptical about the effectiveness of IQ testing in
determining the presence of the condition. See LILIANE SPRENGER-CHAROLLES ET AL., READING
ACQUISITION AND DEVELOPMENTAL DYSLEXIA 72-73 (2006); see also SHAYWITZ, supra, at 139
(“There is an emerging consensus among researchers and clinicians that the dependence on a
discrepancy between IQ and reading achievement for a diagnosis of dyslexia has outlived its
usefulness except in very limited circumstances.”).
198
Reschly, supra note 190 (“[A]ll studies that I have read or conducted on children and youth
with LD confirms virtually without any exceptions that all have significant achievement problems.
. . . There is no “fraud” in LD. On that I believe most will agree.”).
199
SHAYWITZ, supra note 197, at 164.
200
See id. (“I am puzzled by the often-repeated notion that some students pretend to be dyslexic.
When asked about this, I always respond by asking in turn, ‘Do you know this for a fact? Are you
personally aware of such a case?’ Invariably the person shakes her head and replies, ‘Oh no, it’s
just something I heard.’ Such notions are nonsense.”).
201
Gresham, supra note 181 (“Ostensibly, ‘verbal’ learners should learn more efficiently and
effectively under verbal instruction and ‘visual’ learners should learn more efficiently and
effectively under visual instruction. Unfortunately, there is little empirical support for the
differential prescription of treatments based on different abilities or aptitudes . . . .”); Reschly,
supra note 190, (stating that no empirical support exists for methods that match cognitive
strengths of students with LD to teaching modalities).
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never be resolved if children who need assistance can be identified sufficiently
that they can be given instruction that meets their educational needs.202
2. Response to Intervention Methodology. One attempt to provide that
form of instruction is Response to Intervention (RTI) methodology. RTI is a
process by which children in early grades who are not achieving at a level
commensurate with their class or the norms for their grade receive more
individualized and more intense instruction with methods that have been validated
as effective, while at the same time continuing to attend their general education
classes during the lengthy periods of intervention.203 Those children who do not
make adequate progress when exposed to these progressively more intense
methods over a set number of weeks are deemed to have a learning disability.204
Intervention ceases for the rest, although the teacher continues to monitor their
progress regularly. The specialized instruction includes phases (sometimes called
tiers) of intervention.205 The first phase is nothing more than high quality
instruction and careful assessment of the learning progress of all students on the
classroom curriculum.206 Students who are below a proficiency criterion are
referred for a second phase of more intense instruction to meet the weaknesses
their assessments display; these interventions are implemented by the classroom
202

Some authorities appear reluctant to embrace RTI because of the perceived threat it poses to
existing constructs of a distinct learning disability category. See, e.g., Scruggs, supra note 192.
For purposes of educational policy and legislation, however, what matters is not whether a distinct
“learning disabilities” category survives, but what is the best means to educate students who have
difficulties learning when exposed to ordinary instruction and who could be learning more with
appropriate education.
203
Gresham, supra note 181. State education departments have adopted their own definitions of
RTI. For example, Virginia defines RTI (using the abbreviation “RtI”) as “primarily an
instructional framework and philosophy, the goals and objectives of which include early
intervention for students who struggle to attain or maintain grade level performance.” Va. Dep’t
of Educ., Responsive Instruction: Refining Our Work of Teaching All Children 6 (October 2007),
http://www.doe.virginia.gov/VDOE/studentsrvcs/rti_guidance_document.pdf.
The document
describes RTI as involving “universal screening, multiple layers, or ‘tiers,’ of instruction,
intervention, and support, and progress monitoring (an integrated data collection and assessment
system to inform decision making).” Id. at 7.
204
Lynn S. Fuchs et al., Response to Intervention: A Strategy for the Prevention and Identification
of Learning Disabilities, in EDUCATING INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES: IDEIA 2004 AND
BEYOND, supra note 185, at 115, 116 (“The premise behind RTI is that students are identified as
having LD when their response to validated intervention is dramatically inferior to that of their
peers . . . . The inference is that these children who respond poorly to generally effective
interventions have a disability that requires specialized treatment to produce successful learning
outcomes.”).
205
See id. at 115-23 (describing three-tiered model).
206
Learning Disabilities Ass’n of America, The Role of Parents/Family in Responsiveness to
Intervention, http://www.ldaamerica.org/news/print_role-parents.asp (visited Aug. 4, 2008); see
Gresham, supra note 181 (describing monitoring at this phase). Classwide screening ties into
NCLB. NCLB’s Reading First initiative gives funding for reading programs for children in
kindergarten through grade three, and one of the required uses of the money is “administering
screening, diagnostic, and classroom-based instructional reading assessments.” 20 U.S.C.A. §
6362(c)(7)(i) (West 2008). Thanks to Suzanne Whitney for this insight.
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teacher over a period of perhaps six weeks.207 Students whose progress is not
adequate enter a third phase, in which they receive a specially designed set of
educational interventions for a period of eight or more weeks.208 This phase may
or may not be designated special education.209 Children who do not respond to
intervention after this intensive intervention may be designated as having a
learning disability on the basis of the failure to respond or on that basis plus other
indicators.210
IDEA does not require the use of RTI, but amendments made in the 2004
Reauthorization pave the way for RTI by forbidding states from forcing school
districts to use discrepancy criteria when determining if a child has a specific
learning disability.211 The Reauthorization also creates a funding stream for RTI
by permitting school districts to use up to 15% of federal special education
funding to provide services to children who have not been found to be eligible
under IDEA but who need additional support to succeed in general education.212
These “Early Intervening Services” funds may be used to underwrite RTI.213
IDEA further provides that a child shall not be identified as a child with a

207

Gresham, supra note 181.
Id. One source describes the intervention as about thirty minutes of supplemental instruction a
day, with progress monitored twice a month; the phase, under this model, may last ten to twenty
weeks. Douglas Marston, Tiers of Intervention in Responsiveness to Intervention, J. LEARNING
DISABILITIES 539, 540 (2005).
209
Gresham, supra note 181. (“Essentially, this phase represents a special-education diagnostic
trial period . . . .”). Some models incorporate a fourth tier of even more specialized instruction,
but as with the composite model Gresham describes, the latter phases might be designated special
education. See Council for Exceptional Children, Response to Intervention—The Promise and the
Peril,
http:www.cec.sped.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cf
m&CONTENTID=8427 (visited Aug. 4, 2008) (“Special education teachers may help develop
interventions and/or plan assessments for students receiving instruction and interventions in Tiers
1 and 2. They may not provide instruction to students until Tier 3 or 4, when the student could be
referred and identified for special education.”).
210
See Council for Exceptional Children, supra note 209 (“Students who do not respond to
intervention are referred to special education. This step is taken after intensive intervention has
not helped.”). There is disagreement about how much weight should be placed on the simple fact
of failure to make adequate progress following the interventions in the determination of learning
disability, and how many additional assessments should be undertaken. See id. (collecting
educational research sources).
211
20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(b)(6)(A) (West 2008). The statute specifically permits school districts to
“use a process that determines if the child responds to scientific, research-based intervention as
part of the evaluation procedures” in ascertaining whether the child has specific learning
disabilities. § 1414(b)(6)(B). The Department of Education has interpreted the Act as permitting
state educational agencies to require local school districts to use RTI. U.S. Dep’t of Educ.,
Questions and Answers On Response to Intervention (RTI) and Early Intervening Services (EIS),
Question C-4 (Jan. 2007),
http://idea.ed.gov/explore/view/p/%2Croot%2Cdynamic%2CQaCorner%2C8%2C.
212
20 U.S.C.A. § 1413(f).
213
20 U.S.C.A. § 1413(f)(1), (2)(B).
208
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disability for purposes of the statute if the “determinant factor” is lack of
appropriate instruction in reading or mathematics.214 A goal of RTI is to exclude
from the learning disability category those children whose difficulties stem simply
from lack of adequate instruction.215
The United States Department of Education regulations implementing the
2004 Reauthorization also promote the use of RTI methods. The Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking urged recipients of federal special education funding to
abandon IQ discrepancy and extolled the benefits of an RTI process.216 The final
regulations repeat the statutory language permitting non-discrepancy methods for
determining LD, including methods relying on the child’s response to scientific,
research-based intervention.217 Moreover, they omit a provision in the earlier
regulations stating that a child could be determined to have a specific learning
disability if he or she “has a severe discrepancy between achievement and
intellectual ability in one or more” areas of learning.218 The regulations modify
the prior rule’s reference to achievement commensurate with age “and ability
levels” and make it achievement adequate for age or meeting state-approved
grade-level standards.219
The new regulations add extensive provisions requiring determinations
that findings with regard to performance or progress of the child are not
“primarily the result of” other disabilities or disadvantages, and they require
consideration of data that demonstrate that before, or as part of the referral
process, the child received appropriate instruction delivered by qualified
personnel in general education settings, and “data-based documentation of
repeated assessments of achievement at reasonable intervals, reflecting formal
assessment of student progress during instruction, which was provided to the
child’s parents.”220 Perhaps something other than an RTI process could provide
the relevant data and documentation, but properly implemented RTI methods are
an obvious way to gather the data and produce the documentation.

214

20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(b)(5)(A)-(B).
See Fuchs et al., supra note 204, at 116 (“[I]f an at-risk student responds well to intervention,
then their low achievement can be attributed to lack of appropriate instruction, not a learning
disability.”).
216
70 Fed. Reg. 35,864, 35,802 (June 21, 2005).
217
34 C.F.R. § 300.307(a) (2008); see § 300.309(a)(2)(i).
218
34 C.F.R. § 300.541(a)(2) (2007) (superseded).
219
34 C.F.R. § 300.309(a)(1) (2008). The regulations appear to allow for the use of some
discrepancy-based methods by permitting eligibility when the child “exhibits a pattern of strengths
and weaknesses in performance, achievement, or both, relative to age, State-approved grade-level
standards, or intellectual development, that is determined . . . to be relevant to the identification of
a specific learning disability, using appropriate assessments” otherwise consistent with the
regulations. § 300.309(a)(2)(ii).
220
34 C.F.R. § 300.309(b); see also § 300.310 (requiring class observation of the child prior to
determination); § 300.311 (requiring additional documentation on various topics related to specific
learning disability determination).
215
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3. Benefits of RTI. Even those who defend discrepancy methodology may
have to agree that there are virtues to an RTI approach. First, it delivers
instructional intervention to children who need it, and it does so before test score
discrepancies emerge, which typically occurs in grade three or later.221 Second,
even for students who eventually are found to be special education-eligible, the
method gives data about which educational interventions do or do not produce
progress for a specific child, something discrepancy testing methods do not
achieve, and which will likely be useful in designing a special education
program.222 Third, RTI may help keep students who do not actually have learning
disabilities out of special education, while at the same time conferring educational
benefit on them. These are children who may be characterized as “instructional
casualties” (the victims of poor teaching practices who could learn if exposed to
good teaching), or who come from troubled home environments, or who have
other non-disability related circumstances that keep them from learning as well as
they can.223
A frequently cited benefit of RTI is that it reduces referrals224 to special
education.225 There are difficulties with considering this a true consequence of
RTI, or, for that matter, a benefit. Although many studies show a reduction in
referrals when school districts use RTI,226 the referral count is extremely easy to
manipulate. A school district can simply send the word out to teachers not to
make special education referrals.227 Informal messages of this type are extremely

221

Nat’l Joint Comm. on Learning Disabilities, Responsiveness to Intervention and Learning
Disabilities, 28 LEARNING DISABILITY Q. 249, 252 (2005). The use of objective criteria for
intervention in the form of classwide assessments has the related advantage of not requiring the
child to wait for a referral to special education (something typically initiated by the classroom
teacher) before receiving help. See Fletcher et al., supra note 188 (“Teacher referral has been
demonstrated to be biased, yielding disproportionate numbers of boys and AfricanAmericans,
likely reflecting behavior management difficulties that make many referred students difficult to
manage in the classroom.”).
222
Nat’l Joint Comm. on Learning Disabilities, supra note 221, at 252.
223
Fletcher et al., supra note 188 (discussing “instructional casualties” to be provided accelerated
instruction under RTI methodology); Spear-Swerling, supra note 185, at 277 (“In their emphases
on high-quality Tier 1 instruction and timely, research-based interventions, RTI approaches have
the potential to benefit a broad range of children, not only those with genuine LD.”).
224
Referral practices are the key, because most children referred by their teachers are determined
to be eligible. See Reschly, supra note 190 (“Findings indicate that 90% of students referred by
teachers are evaluated for special education and 70% are found eligible.”).
225
See, e.g., Nat’l Joint Comm. on Learning Disabilities, supra note 221, at 252.
226
See, e.g., Fletcher et al., supra note 188 (citing studies from California and Connecticut).
227
An example of this is the Virginia RTI plan, which states that “Only after several . . .
systematic and research-grounded interventions have been implemented and evaluated, and a child
has consistently failed to make adequate progress, may s/he be considered for special education
evaluation.” Va. Dep’t of Educ., supra note 203, at 2. In fact, the relevant federal regulation
simply states that the group determining the existence of a child’s learning disability “must
consider, as part of the evaluation . . .data that demonstrate that prior to, or as a part of, the referral
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likely when local administrators have invested money and prestige in an elaborate
RTI program.228 One of the best known proponents of RTI, Douglas Fuchs, has
cautioned about these tactics: “It’s easy to reduce the numbers of children in
special education programs. You just have to stop referring them.”229 Moreover,
if decreasing the number of students referred to and receiving special education
means that children who need help receive fewer or less effective services, the
situation will have been made worse in the name of making it better.
4. Problems with RTI. Balanced against the possible benefits of RTI are a
number of anticipated difficulties with it. The first is that of the bright child who
achieves at grade level despite dyslexia or some other learning disability who
could nevertheless benefit from special education. Dyslexia, for example, can be
present in a child with high general intelligence.230 Estimates of the percentage of
children with learning disabilities who are gifted range from 2-5%.231 These
students tend to use their general intelligence to compensate for weaknesses in
phonics, memorization, computation, or other tasks, and are likely not to be
identified as having learning disabilities until later in their schooling than other
students with learning disabilities.232 By allowing for a discrepancy standard, the
pre-2006 regulations made explicit the possibility of IDEA eligibility for a child
achieving at grade level or higher whose achievement was nevertheless far below
his or her ability.233 The Department of Education has declared that failure in
grade must not be used as a standard for eligibility,234 but it appears likely that
RTI screening will never identify the child achieving at grade level who has an
process, the child was provided appropriate instruction in regular education settings, delivered by
qualified personnel . . .” 34 C.F.R. § 300.309(b)(1) (2008). This provision creates a standard for
the process of finding eligibility, not a standard for when a child may be considered for eligibility.
228
See Michael Alison Chandler, Waiting Too Late to Test?, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2007, at B01,
available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/30/AR2007123002447_pf.html
(“For many school systems, RTI-influenced strategies have led to a significant drop in the number
of special education students. . . . The new approach has led to a backlash among parents who say
their children aren’t getting the help they need. A parent-led advisory committee told the Loudoun
School Board in the fall that the school system appeared to be under-identifying students who
should qualify for special education.”).
229
Id.
230
SHAYWITZ, supra note 197, at 82.
231
Tonya R. Moon et al., Twice-Exceptional Students, in EDUCATING INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES: IDEIA 2004 AND BEYOND, supra note 185, at 295, 296-97.
232
Id. at 298.
233
See 34 C.F.R. § 300.541(a)(2) (2007) (superseded).
234
Letter to Anonymous, 41 Individuals with Disabilities Educ. L. Rep. 212 (U.S. Dep’t of Educ.,
Off. of Special Educ. & Rehabilitative Servs. 2004). The duty to identify, locate, and evaluate all
children suspected of being children with disabilities applies “even though they are advancing
from grade to grade.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.111(c)(1) (2008). Programs such as Advanced Placement
and International Baccalaureate must not discriminate against qualified students with learning or
other disabilities. Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Access by Students with
Disabilities to Accelerated Programs (Dec. 26, 2007),
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-20071226.html.
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achievement discrepancy and could benefit from special education instruction.235
The National Joint Committee on Learning Disabilities identified this as a serious
potential difficulty with RTI, stating in its Report, “A particular concern is
whether RTI is prone to systematic errors in identifying students with LD. For
example, the underachievement criterion may exclude some high-ability students
with LD from special education.”236
A second problem is simply that of compliance with RTI requirements
when the program is implemented on a large scale. The method mandates that
teachers use only scientifically supported instructional techniques; school
personnel must monitor individual children’s progress rigorously.237 There is no
clear protocol for what should happen if a teacher deviates from the techniques,
say by providing negative reinforcement238 when positive is called for or failing to
enter timely progress reports. Must the intervention start over from the time of
the failure to comply? An intervention conducted without integrity could result in
the child’s failing to make progress not because of the presence of a learning
disability but because of inadequate instruction.239 There is little guidance so far
from courts or other sources of legal interpretation on the remedy for program
integrity failures, although in an instance in which a school district failed to
“follow the prescribed protocol for an RTI process” before concluding that a child
had no specific learning disability, a challenge was sustained by the Pennsylvania

235

Kavale et al., supra note 191 (“What is also clear is that eliminating IQ-achievement
discrepancy would result in a significant number of students with SLD not being identified when
using only a relative discrepancy or low achievement criterion for determining eligibility.”); see
Townsend, supra note 175, at 264 (“[The RTI] approach becomes a ceiling on the ability of
students with high potential, who can achieve scores in the average range in spite of their learning
disability, preventing them from getting the help they need to realize their full potential.”).
236
See Nat’l Joint Comm. on Learning Disabilities, supra note 221, at 253 (“These students, by
compensating with their intellectual strengths and making good use of support services, often
manage to achieve within the normal range and, therefore, are unlikely to receive the early
individualized instruction that would enable them to make academic progress consistent with their
abilities.”). But see Moon et al., supra note 231, at 302 (suggesting use of RTI in combination
with other strategies in identifying gifted children with LD). The authors do not explain how
bright children who compensate for their weaknesses with skilled guesswork or other mechanisms
to perform at an average level will be identified and provided assistance to become better learners.
237
Even the most rigorous program does not eliminate individual judgment. See Gerber, supra
note 197 (“Even teachers of small intervention groups make decisions to continue or adjust
instruction based on evaluation of quality (e.g., automaticity or fluency) as well as accuracy of
students’ responses. Such decisions and the choices that follow cannot be fully programmed in
advance without ignoring potentially meaningful individual differences among students.”). One
source, however, comments that fidelity to protocol is a problem with non-RTI evaluation
mechanisms as well. Reschly, supra note 190 (“Implementation fidelity, however, is not a
problem unique to RTI.”).
238
Yelling, for example. Professor Gerber politely notes, “Teachers differ as individuals despite
the quality of their professional preparation . . . like their students, they cannot be made identical.”
Gerber, supra note 197.
239
See Gresham, supra note 181 (“[F]ailure to find significant treatment effects might be
explained by poor component integrity over time, by poor daily or session integrity, or both.”).
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State Educational Agency’s due process hearing appeals review officer, who
awarded tuition reimbursement to the parents for a private program for the
child.240 Implementation of RTI is also likely to be costly in terms of teacher
training time and purchased programs,241 although there may be long-term
savings if children are kept from needing expensive services later.242
Exacerbating compliance problems is the reality that the evidence
supporting the effectiveness of RTI interventions across the curriculum and across
age ranges is surprisingly incomplete. Although various interventions are
scientifically validated with regard to reading mechanics, interventions directed to
reading comprehension have proven ineffective,243 and specialized instruction in
other areas remains unproven.244 It is true that reading is the most common area

240

Upper Darby Sch. Dist., 106 LRP 60495 (Pa. State Educ. Agency 2006).
Council for Exceptional Children, supra note 209 (“Implementing RTI is a substantial
undertaking. Staff may need professional development in the RTI process as well as in researchbased instruction and progress monitoring. To assist teachers, some schools provide training and
manuals on acceptable interventions. In addition, schools may bring in outside support, such as a
university, to help teachers learn and teach curriculum.”). One source cites indicates that twenty
hours of training plus weekly followup sessions will be required for tutors, and forty hours of
baseline training for classroom teachers. Gerber, supra note 197 (collecting studies).
242
See Gresham, supra note 181 (discussing cost-benefit comparison).
243
NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. EVALUATION & REG’L ASSISTANCE, INST. OF EDUC. SCIS., READING
FIRST IMPACT STUDY: INTERIM REPORT, at xiv (Apr. 2008), available at
http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/pdf/20084016.pdf (“On average, Reading First did not improve students’
reading comprehension. The program did not increase the percentages of students in grades one,
two, or three, whose reading comprehension scores were at or above grade level. In each of the
three grades, fewer than half of the students in the Reading First schools were reading at or above
grade level.”); see Sam Dillon, An Initiative on Reading Is Rated Ineffective, N.Y. TIMES, May 2,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/02/education/02reading.html?pagewanted=print
(summarizing and discussing findings of Interim Report). The Reading First program, which is
the principal innovation in reading instruction associated with the No Child Left Behind Initiative,
has been criticized for cronyism, among other things. See Kathleen Conn, The Evolution of K-12
Educational Malpractice Claims: Will the “Reading First” Scandals Influence Statutory Causes
of Action Under NCLBA and IDEIA?, 221 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 21 (2007).
244
For a compilation of favorable results in trials of math intervention, see Lynn S. Fuchs et al.,
Response to Intervention, in EDUCATING INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES: IDEIA 2004 AND
BEYOND, supra note 185, at 115, 125-27. The authors note that validation of protocols for written
language and science remains to be accomplished. Id. at 124. Some other experts regard math
RTI as a work in progress. David Chard et al., Systems of Instruction and Assessment to Improve
Mathematics Achievement for Students with Disabilities: The Potential and Promise of RTI, in
EDUCATING INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES: IDEIA 2004 AND BEYOND, supra, at 227, 228
(“Most research and development in RTI implementation and evaluation have taken place in early
reading education. Our interest is in promoting similar efforts in mathematics. However,
developing RTI models in mathematics education will be a formidable challenge.”). Other
authorities are more skeptical about the scientific support for RTI processes in general. See Jack
A. Naglieri & Alan S. Kaufman, IDEIA and Specific Learning Disabilities, in EDUCATING
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES: IDEIA 2004 AND BEYOND, supra, at 165, 189 (“The evidence
examined by Fuchs et al. (2003) and Naglieri and Crockett (2005) suggest that there is little
evidence to demonstrate the utility of RTI.”); see also Kavale et al., supra note 191 (describing
241
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in which learning disabilities manifest themselves,245 but there is a serious gap
regarding scientifically validated instruction in other areas.246 Problems also exist
with respect to implementation of RTI methods in the upper grades. Research is
limited regarding appropriate protocols for RTI for children beyond their first few
years in school.247 Some authorities are skeptical about whether RTI methods can
work for older children at all.248 When there is no scientifically validated protocol
with which to comply, implementation is impossible.249
A third problem is that of affording parents and children their important
procedural protections while implementing RTI. For example, under IDEA
parents are entitled to notice and the opportunity to give or withhold consent to
evaluation.250 RTI is a method of evaluation, and the fact that the regulations
providing for RTI are listed under the “Evaluation” heading implies that notice of
use of RTI evaluation methods must be provided.251 Screenings for instructional
purposes are not considered evaluations, but RTI involves much more than simple
screening.252 RTI is an educational methodology, not an interpretation of legal
requirements, so there is no clear point at which notice must be given to parents in
the RTI protocols themselves. An additional procedural right under the law is that
a parent may request an evaluation for special education eligibility at any time.253
support for use of RTI with regard to anything but phonemic awareness in young children as
inadequate).
245
Spear-Swerling, supra note 185, at 273 (“[O]ver 90% of children classified as LD prior to fifth
grade are identified based primarily on problems in reading.”) (citing 1992 data).
246
Scruggs, supra note 192 (“[I]ntensive instruction can improve reading skills, but this does not
‘cure’ the learning disability, which may have a number of other manifestations. That is, deficits
in sustained attention, semantic memory, organizational skills, perceptual motor skills, or social
interactions could lead to problems in a number of other school tasks . . . .”).
247
Spear-Swerling, supra note 185, at 287; see Scruggs, supra note 192 (“Presently, the model
addresses primarily reading in primary grades, and tells us little about how learning disabilities
might be evaluated at higher grade levels, and when the problems emerge primarily as failures in
content area learning.”); Semrud-Clikeman, supra note 197 (“Most of the research has centered on
children in kindergarten and first grade classrooms. There is very little empirical evidence that
this program is appropriate for children at older ages. Prior to implementation of this program for
all children it would be very appropriate to conduct studies with children in middle school and
high school.”).
248
See Michele Goyette-Ewing & Sherin Stahl, New Individuals with Disabilities Improvement
Act and Psychological Assessment, in EDUCATING INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES: IDEIA 2004
AND BEYOND, supra note 185, at 421, 432 (“Will we be using a wait-to-fail approach with these
older children, if we depend on RTI as the primary tool for determining a learning disability?”).
Others are more sanguine. See Saylor Heidmann, Reading Assessment and IDEIA, in EDUCATING
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES: IDEIA 2004 AND BEYOND, supra, at 435, 447-50 (relying on
anecdotal information).
249
See Jennifer H. Lindstrom et al., Assessment and Eligibility of Students with Disabilities, in
EDUCATING INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES: IDEIA 2004 AND BEYOND, supra note 185, at 197,
204.
250
34 C.F.R. § 300.304(a) (2008); see § 300.509.
251
See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.301-.311.
252
See 34 C.F.R. § 300.302. (covering screening for instructional purposes).
253
See 34 C.F.R. § 300.301(b)..
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It is not clear exactly what happens if that occurs during RTI. A report of the
National Research Center on Learning Disabilities notes: “A potentially difficult
situation might arise if parents exercise their right to request an evaluation and
LEAs [school districts] do not have clearly described steps, components,
procedures, and criteria for SLD determination and for whether and how a
student’s response to scientific, research-based intervention is included.”254
Parents also have the right to demand an independent educational evaluation if
they disagree with the public school’s evaluation of their child.255 It is difficult to
imagine how this would include RTI, so IQ-discrepancy or some other method
would need to be retained for this purpose.256 What is more, neither the United
States Department of Education257 nor professional sources258 anticipate that RTI
will be used as the sole criterion for a finding of special education eligibility, but
if IQ test-discrepancy methods are abandoned, one cannot tell what the other
criteria will be.
Timelines are an important part of IDEA procedural protections. The
general time limit for evaluation is sixty days after receipt of parental consent.259
School districts have to adhere to the time limits in determining specific learning
disability unless the parents agree to a written extension.260 RTI can be a lengthy
process, even if the lapse of time is to some degree compensated by educational
benefit some children will receive. Judicial remedies exist for delay in
determining special education eligibility. For example, in Board of Education v.
L.M., the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that a child should receive a
compensatory education remedy to permit a child whose evaluation was delayed

254

Nat’l Research Ctr. on Learning Disabilities, Responsiveness to Intervention in Conjunction
with Learning Disability Determination (Winter 2007),
http://www.nrcld.org/resource_kit/general/RTIbrief2007.pdf.
255
34 C.F.R. § 300.502 (2008). The independent evaluation must be at public expense unless the
school district requests a hearing and demonstrates that its evaluation is appropriate. § 300.502(b).
256
Another mystery is how to apply RTI to determine eligibility for private school students.
School districts have the obligation to identify, locate and evaluate those students by undertaking
activities similar to those undertaken for public school students, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(ii)
(West 2008), but lack the ability to modify the private schools’ general education to embrace RTI
methods.
257
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., supra note 211, at C-6 (“[A]n RTI process does not replace the need for a
comprehensive evaluation.”); see 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(b)(2) (West 2008) (“In conducting the
evaluation, the local educational agency shall . . . use a variety of assessment tools and strategies
to gather relevant functional, developmental, and academic information . . . [and] not use any
single measure or assessment as the sole criterion for determining whether a child is a child with a
disability . . . .”).
258
Nat’l Research Ctr. on Learning Disabilities, supra note 254 (“RTI is introduced into the statute
as one part of the evaluation, eligibility determination, individualized education program, and
educational placement procedures, not as the only evaluation procedure. The inference is that SLD
determination is not based on a sole criterion of a child’s response to an intervention.”).
259
34 C.F.R. § 300.301(c)(1)(i). States may enact different time limits. § 300.301(c)(1)(ii).
260
34 C.F.R. § 300.309(c).
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during his third and fourth grade years “to catch up with his peers.”261 The court
adopted a standard for actionable violations that “the claimant ‘must show that
school officials overlooked clear signs of disability and were negligent in failing
to order testing, or that there was no rational justification for deciding not to
evaluate.’”262 This standard may be met in some cases when a school system uses
RTI but takes no other steps on behalf of the child while time continues to elapse.
On the other hand, the delay actually has to cause harm for relief to be proper. In
Lesesne v. District of Columbia, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
ruled that the parent would not prevail in a case over failure to meet an evaluation
deadline unless the parent could demonstrate that a child suffered harm from the
delay.263 In a situation where the child has received RTI but has not received any
other form of evaluation or been deemed eligible for special education, claims
based on delay may be difficult to sustain if the child obtained benefit from the
RTI comparable to what would have been received in special education. When
that is not the case, a remedy is appropriate if timelines have been violated.
The fourth problem with RTI is the interaction of disciplinary protections
with delays in identification of the child as a child with a disability.264 Under
IDEA, students who are eligible for special education cannot have their services
completely terminated, no matter what conduct they may have been accused of or
engaged in.265 If the child is suspended or otherwise removed from his or her
educational placement for ten days in the same school year, ongoing educational
services have to be provided; although the services may be in a different setting,
they must enable the child to participate in the general education curriculum and
to continue to make progress on individualized educational program (IEP)
goals.266 Every child who is removed is entitled to receive a functional behavioral
assessment and behavior intervention services and modifications.267 Before
making any long-term change in the child’s placement, the IEP team must
determine whether the misconduct was a manifestation of the child’s disability.268
If the conduct was a manifestation, the school has to conduct a functional
behavioral assessment and modify the child’s behavior plan as necessary.269
Unless the child’s conduct involved weapons, drugs, or infliction of serious
bodily injury, the school must return the child to his or her previous placement.270

261

478 F.3d 307, 316 (6th Cir.2007).
Id. at 313 (quoting Clay T. v. Walton County Sch. Dist., 952 F. Supp. 817, 823 (M.D. Ga.
1997)).
263
447 F.3d 828 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
264
The same problem, of course, arises for children who are ultimately not found eligible for
special education if their needs are remediated during the RTI process.
265
20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (West 2008).
266
34 C.F.R. § 300.530(d)(1)(i) (2008).
267
34 C.F.R. § 300.530(d)(1)(ii).
268
34 C.F.R. § 300.530(e).
269
Id.
270
34 C.F.R. § 300.530(f).
262
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Even in the weapons, drugs, and serious injury cases, the removal is limited to
forty-five school days.271 Various appeal rights also exist.272
These rights in connection with the discipline process are extremely
important to children and their parents. Though the law says that the rights apply
in limited instances for a child who has not yet been determined to be a child with
a disability when the school had knowledge that the child was a child with a
disability,273 the applicability of that provision is far from certain. The United
States Department of Education has taken the position that participation in RTI,
standing alone, is not enough to supply the basis in knowledge to trigger the
discipline protections.274 Parents can be expected to resist the use of RTI
processes that delay the eligibility determination or entirely prevent their children
from being deemed eligible if they perceive the children as vulnerable to student
discipline that could result in suspension or expulsion from school without the
protection afforded students who have received a determination of IDEA
eligibility. State educational agencies or local school board could, of course,
avoid any conflicts on this topic by voluntarily extending protections similar to
those that apply to IDEA-eligible children to all children, or at least to all those in
RTI. It is hardly consistent with sound educational methods to have any
students—those officially considered to have disabilities and those not—out of
school for long periods of time with no opportunity to make educational
progress.275
5. RTI’s Role in the Eligibility Mess. Despite the apparent drawbacks of
RTI, the IQ-discrepancy controversy and RTI response to it would not necessarily
present a problem for IDEA eligibility policy. Indeed, these developments might
be an opportunity to set learning disabilities intervention on a sounder footing
while benefiting students whose learning problems do not show up in an IQ
profile. The developments thus may advance in part the services-for-all-whoneed-them approach embodied in the not-quite-so-special education model. The
difficulty—and the reasons things are now a mess and may get worse—is the
likely exclusion of children who could benefit significantly from learning
disabilities services but who perform well enough on screenings that they are not

271

34 C.F.R. § 300.530(g) (2008).
34 C.F.R. § 300.532.
273
See 34 C.F.R. § 300.534.
274
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., supra note 211 , at F-3.
275
Even if only the most important protections were afforded, such as the right to continued
services in an alternative setting during periods of suspension, children would benefit and parental
pressure for rapid eligibility determinations would diminish. No warranties are made regarding
the political palatability of this proposal, but it may be noted that after significant agitation to
eliminate disciplinary protections for children with disabilities in the debates leading up to the
2004 Reauthorization, the changes made were fairly modest and the legislation even contains a
provision expressing disapproval of zero-tolerance policies. See Weber, supra note 23, at 34-39
(discussing, inter alia, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(k)(1)(A), which calls for consideration of unique
circumstances on case-by-case basis when disciplining students with disabilities).
272
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selected for RTI, and the inclusion of children in the early phases of RTI for
protracted periods when they should be receiving more intense services. The
mess will become worse if schools attempt to implement RTI on a grand scale
without sufficient personnel training or preparation, or if the schools violate the
internal tenets of RTI by applying it to groups of children for which there is no
scientifically validated intervention available. Schools must also determine how
to protect procedural rights as they implement RTI, and they need to afford
disciplinary protections to all children who are suspected of having disabilities,
which likely is the entire category of children in RTI and a number of others
besides.
C. African-American Overrepresentation
Caselaw trends and changes in learning disabilities evaluation
methodology join with a third major development in producing the IDEA
eligibility mess. That development is the belated awareness that African
American children are significantly overrepresented in some special education
eligibility categories. This realization has led to legislative action, well-founded
concerns about discrimination, and overdue attention to the problem of separate
settings for children in the special education system. There are those who would
respond to the development by further limiting special education eligibility. A
better approach is to address the problems of isolation, stigma, and low
expectations directly.
The United States Department of Education reports that there are major
differences among racial and ethnic groups with regard to special education
eligibility, particularly with regard to mental retardation and emotional
disturbance. According to the Annual Report on the Implementation of the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, statistics for the most recent year
available demonstrated that “the percentage [of students] receiving special
education (i.e., risk index) was largest for American Indian/Alaska Native
students (13.8 percent), followed by black (12.4 percent), white (8.7 percent) and
Asian/Pacific Islander (4.5 percent) students.”276 The report continued: “Black
students were 3.0 times more likely to receive special education and related
services for mental retardation and 2.3 times more likely to receive special
education and related services for emotional disturbance than all other
racial/ethnic groups combined.”277
276

U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 1 TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT 38 (2005), available
at http://www.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/osep/2005/parts-b-c/27th-vol-1.pdf (discussing data for
students ages 6-21).
277
Id. at 40. There is disproportional representation of other ethnic groups as well, but the pattern
is more geographically scattered and indicates statistical underrepresentation as well. Daniel J.
Losen & Kevin G. Welner, Disabling Discrimination in Our Public Schools: Comprehensive
Legal Challenges to Inappropriate and Inadequate Special Education Services for Minority
Children, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 412 (2001) (“Although African Americans appear to
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This information is not new, but instead reflects long-term data trends.
Two well-known authorities describe the situation in the following terms:
[T]rends include the following: (a) pronounced and persistent
racial disparities in identification between white and black children
in the categories of mental retardation and emotional disturbance,
compared with far less disparity in the category of specific learning
disabilities; (b) a minimal degree of racial disparity in medically
diagnosed disabilities [such as deafness, blindness, and orthopedic
impairment] as compared with subjective cognitive disabilities; (c)
dramatic differences in the incidence of disability from one state to
the next; and gross disparities between blacks and Hispanics, and
between boys and girls, in identification rates for the categories of
mentally retarded and emotionally disturbed.278
The ethnic disparities, particularly the overrepresentation of AfricanAmericans in the mental retardation and emotional disturbance categories, have
attracted congressional attention. The 2004 IDEA Reauthorization requires states
to have “policies and procedures designed to prevent the inappropriate
overidentification or disproportionate representation by race and ethnicity of
children as children with disabilities.”279 States must collect and examine student
data to determine if significant disproportionality on the basis of race and
ethnicity is taking place in the state or its local school districts with regard to
special education identification, placement in particular settings, and incidence,
duration, and type of disciplinary actions.280 If there is a determination that
significant disproportionality is occurring with respect to identification or
placement, the state has to provide for the review and, if appropriate, the revision
of policies, procedures, and practices used in identification and placement.281 The
state must also require any local school district found to have a significant
bear the brunt of overidentification, the evidence indicates that all minority groups are vulnerable
to discrimination in identification for special education. For example, Hispanics, Native
Americans, and Asian Pacific Americans are each overrepresented in mental retardation
classifications at more than three times the rate of whites in at least one state. In most states,
however, Hispanics and Asian Pacific Americans are more likely to be overrepresented.”) (relying
on data compiled by Thomas Parrish).
278
Daniel J. Losen & Gary Orfield, Racial Inequity in Special Education, in RACIAL INEQUITY IN
SPECIAL EDUCATION supra note 48, at xv, xxiii. Other disparities appear even when these
particular disparities vanish. California eliminated overrepresentation of African-Americans
classed as students with mild mental retardation over the period from 1980 to 1994, but
overrepresentation of African-Americans identified as having learning disabilities increased
substantially. Donald P. Oswald et al., Community and School Predictors of Overrepresentation of
Minority Children in Special Education, in RACIAL INEQUITY IN SPECIAL EDUCATION supra, at 1,
3.
279
20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(24) (West 2008).
280
20 U.S.C.A. § 1418(d)(1).
281
20 U.S.C.A. § 1418(d)(2)(A). The revision of policies has to be publicly reported. §
1418(d)(2)(C).
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disproportionality to reserve the maximum amount of funds (that is, 15% of
federal special education payments) to provide early intervening services to assist
children not yet identified as being children with disabilities.282
Disparities by themselves do not demonstrate discrimination, but some
anomalies in the picture, such as the absence of significant African-American
overrepresentation in medically determinable disability categories and wide
differences by location in identification of African-Americans, support the
inference that discriminatory identification is occurring. Mr. Losen and Professor
Orfield conclude: “The data on disproportionate representation is compatible with
the theory that systemic racial discrimination is a contributing factor where
disparities [in special education identification] are substantial.”283 Poverty, by
itself, does not fully explain the racial disparities.284 Ethnicity remains a
significant predictor of cognitive disability identification even when poverty and
wealth are controlled for in the statistical analysis.285 In addition, the problem of
the “instructional casualty” is likely to be especially pronounced in a situation in
which a child is racially or culturally isolated.286 This conclusion is supported by
the reality that African-American children in wealthier school districts with more
children of high socio-economic status are more likely to be identified as mentally
retarded than African American children in other locales.287
Separate schooling of children with disabilities—that is, education in
specialized classrooms out of the mainstream—is more often the case when the
children with disabilities are African-American. The Department of Education
reports that: “Compared to students with disabilities from other racial/ethnic
groups, black students with disabilities were the least likely to be educated in the
regular classroom for most of the school day (38.6 percent).”288 Conversely,
“White students with disabilities were the most likely to be educated in the
regular classroom for most of the school day (54.7 percent).”289 Very isolated
settings are particularly common for African-American children with disabilities:
“Black students with disabilities were more likely than students with disabilities
from other racial/ethnic groups to be educated outside the regular classroom more
than 60 percent of the day (28.1 percent). They were also more likely to be
educated in [completely] separate environments (5.2 percent).”290

282

20 U.S.C.A. § 1418(d)(2)(B). See generally supra text accompanying notes 59-60, 212-13
(discussing early intervening services).
283
Losen & Orfield, supra note 278, at xxiii.
284
Id.
285
Id. at xxiv.
286
See supra text accompanying note 223 (discussing “instructional casualties”).
287
Losen & Welner, supra note 277, at 415-16 (relying on data compiled by Donald P. Oswald).
288
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 276, at 48.
289
Id.
290
Id.
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These isolated settings impose harm on the children placed in them. To
take the example of children whose behavior disorders manifest themselves in
antisocial conduct, “forced segregation with antisocial peers . . . often reinforces
problem behavior.”291
Moreover, since African-American children are
disproportionately identified as special education-eligible, special education
practices that employ separate placements become an effective mechanism to
segregate African-American children in single-race special education placements,
rather than in racially integrated mainstream classrooms.292 Isolated and isolating
placements need not be the rule.293 They appear to exist in large part because of
the absence of resources to enable children with high needs to learn in their
ordinary classrooms. One source observes that “racially isolated, high-poverty
urban schools may be using special education as triage because they lack supports
for inclusive educational placements.”294
Professor Garda, who has written extensively on the topic of
overrepresentation, believes that a redefinition of the “needs special education”
component of the IDEA eligibility standard is necessary to solve the
overrepresentation problem.295 He would limit IDEA eligibility to students who
need “significant instructional adaptations that are not provided to all students,
regardless of disability.”296 This perspective locates the problem in the fact of
IDEA eligibility, rather than in the reality of separate placements and low

291

David Osher et al., Schools Make a Difference: The Overrepresentation of African American
Youth in Special Education and the Juvenile Justice System, in RACIAL INEQUITY IN SPECIAL
EDUCATION, supra note 48, at 93, 96.
292
Losen & Welner, supra note 277, at 407 (“[A]s a result of misdiagnosis and inappropriate
labeling, special education is far too often a vehicle for the segregation and degradation of
minority children.”).
293
One prominent expert on disability law has challenged the legal presumption favoring
educational settings in which children with disabilities are integrated with those who do not have
disabilities. Ruth Colker, The Disability Integration Presumption: Thirty Years Later, 154 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 789 (2006). For a response, see Mark C. Weber, A Nuanced Approach to the Disability
Integration Presumption, 156 U. PENN. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 174 (2007).
294
Edward Garcia Fierros & James W. Conroy, Double Jeopardy: An Exploration of
Restrictiveness and Race in Special Education, in RACIAL INEQUITY IN SPECIAL EDUCATION,
supra note 48, at 39, 40.
295
Garda, supra note 12, at 1074 (“[W]ithout fundamental changes to, and a proper understanding
of, the “needs special education” eligibility criteria, the educational paradigm adopted in the [2004
Reauthorization] cannot take root, and the eligibility problems will persist.”).
296
Id. Professor Garda would further rule out a student’s eligibility for special education “until all
available accommodations and regular education interventions have proven ineffective.” Id. at
1074-75. Though intended to force general education to take responsibility for students of all
cultures and ethnicities by individualizing instruction, this suggestion, will, I fear, take to an
extreme the wait-to-fail approach that has been so severely criticized regarding learning
disabilities evaluation. See supra text accompanying note 60 (criticizing wait-to-fail approach).
Professor Garda would use a below-average performance standard, rather than a standard of
failing, see Garda, supra note 9, at 491-512, supra note 12, at 1129, but so many children are
below average (half, except in Lake Woebegone) that in practice the standard will likely become
that of failing or nearly so.
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expectations once IDEA eligibility is established. Professor Garda makes a case
that misidentifying a child as having a disability is harmful because of stigma and
loss of self-esteem,297 and anecdotal accounts, such as that of Billy C. Hawkins, a
college president who was labeled mentally retarded as a child, confirm this
view.298 But stigma and loss of self-esteem are by no means solely the results,
and certainly are not the necessary results, of eligibility for special education
services. All students perceived as different are vulnerable to mistreatment that
imposes stigma and psychological harm.299 The sensible response is for schools
to act aggressively to keep teachers and peers from imposing stigma on those
students,300 whether the students are identified for special education or not.301
And there is good ground to doubt that the critical factor in imposition of stigma
or low expectations is the legal identification for special education.302 Students
who are struggling to keep up with the class will be labeled “stupid” or worse
irrespective of how the law classifies them for purposes of statutory
entitlements.303
If revised or reinterpreted eligibility standards keep children who are
floundering in general education classes from a legal entitlement to assistance, the
educational problems they encounter will simply become more intractable.
Difficulties that students experience with the general education curriculum reflect
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Id. at 1082-83.
See Losen & Welner, supra note 277, at 411.
299
See David M. Engel, Law, Culture, and Children with Disabilities: Educational Rights and the
Construction of Difference, 1991 DUKE L.J. 166, 184 (discussing imposition of stigma on persons
with disabilities).
300
See generally Mark C. Weber, Disability Harassment in the Public Schools, 43 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1079, 1155-58 (2002) (discussing steps to prevent and remedy harassment on the basis of
disability).
301
If the student is not found eligible for special education, some of the legal remedies for
harassment will not be available, because they are those furnished under IDEA. See id. at 1110-19
(discussing IDEA remedies).
302
See Arceneaux, supra note 46, at 244 (“Although the term stigma or stigmatization is often
used to describe an outcome of special education, particularly for minorities, there is a lack of
empirical data to support this finding separate from consolidated studies with other variables.”).
303
Some personal narrative may support this point. I attended Catholic grade schools in the
Milwaukee area in the 1960s. There were no special education classes in the schools I attended
and no children identified as special education eligible or given disability classifications.
Nevertheless, it was obvious to everyone which children were struggling to learn. They were
ruthlessly stigmatized and frequently became the victims of harassment. It is hard to imagine that
the mistreatment would have been any worse had they been given a formal disability designation,
and their prospects certainly would have improved had they been afforded support in their
schooling as a matter of entitlement. There are, of course, limits to the value of this observation.
In any given case, an official designation may still have a harmful effect. But much depends on
what the consequences of the designation will be, and if the consequence is an entitlement to
effective services rather than isolation, the designation is worth the disadvantage, particularly if
the school aggressively corrects any peer and teacher mistreatment of children who are so
designated as well as those who are not.
298
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problems that desperately need to be addressed.304 At the present time, the only
system that confers an entitlement to services and the procedural protections to
enforce the entitlement is the special education system.305 General education, as
currently constituted, is not up to the task. One analysis of studies concludes that:
“Keeping minorities who are already performing poorly in the general education
systems that failed them (or inappropriately returning them there from special
education) perpetuates inferior educational outcomes for these students.”306 Even
that analysis assumes that the students will stay in school if the entitlement to
special education disappears, an outcome that is highly unlikely. AfricanAmerican children who manifest mental disabilities are highly vulnerable to
suspension and expulsion from school unless they have the protections that IDEA
gives children who are deemed eligible for special education.307
The true problems are not those of special education identification. They
are isolation, low expectations, and poor outcomes, simpliciter.308 Even Professor
Garda acknowledges that the negative effects of incorrect labels on children are
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Losen and Welner note that “Special education can provide tremendous benefits to children
who need supports and services.” Losen & Welner, supra note 277, at 407.
305
As Losen and Welner acknowledge, Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), places out of
reach individual litigation under the disparate-impact regulations enforcing title VI of the Civil
Rights Act. See id. at 409. Their suggested alternative, litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to
enforce the regulations, see id. at 449-51, seems less than promising in light of recent cases
restricting the applicability of that cause of action, notably Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273
(2002), and City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005). See ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 8.8, at 570 (5th ed. 2007) (“Together, . . . the Supreme
Court’s two most recent decisions—City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams and Gonzaga
University v. Doe—reveal a Court very much seeking to narrow the ability to use § 1983 to
enforce federal statutes.”) .
306
Oswald et al., supra note 278, at 3.
307
See Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Racial Justice and Equity for African-American Males in the
American Educational System: A Dream Forever Deferred, 29 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1, 29 (2006)
(“Unfortunately, the IDEA has been at times a double-edged sword. . . . [I]t has been overly used
to label and disproportionately place African-American males in special education programs and
out of mainstream educational instruction. At the same time, African-American males with
mental disabilities have been suspended and expelled from school in lieu of receiving services
required by the IDEA.”) (footnotes omitted).
308
Reschly, supra note 190 (“The most vulnerable feature in modern special education for persons
with high incidence disabilities is insufficient documentation of positive benefits to children and
youth. . . . Moreover, when positive outcomes are documented in LD, the magnitude is modest.”);
see also Beth Harry et al, Of Rocks and Soft Places: Using Qualitative Methods to Investigate
Disproportionality, in RACIAL INEQUITY IN SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra note 48, at 71, 72 (noting
that disproportionate special education identification by race “is problematic . . . [in] that there
continues to be doubt that placement in special education programs results in beneficial outcomes
for many students.”). Positive outcomes appear to vary by race. The Department of Education
reports that 59.1% of white children with disabilities graduate from high school with a regular
diploma, while only 36.2% of African-American children with disabilities do so. The respective
dropout rates are 29.9% and 41.7%. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 276, at 53; Osher et al.,
supra note 291, at 94 (“While academic outcomes are poor for all youth with emotional and
behavioral disorders, they are particularly dismal for African Americans.”).
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“compounded by their placement in classes separate from their peers with less
demanding curriculums.”309 Rather than redefining any component of the special
education eligibility standard to eliminate a child’s entitlement to services
appropriate to his or her educational needs, the prescription should be to improve
the quality of special education services and deliver them to children who remain
in the general education classroom, with the services provided so intensely that
the students meet the same expectations for achievement as everyone else is
meeting.
That being said, a number of incremental steps addressed to
overrepresentation may be appropriate. State funding formulas that do not
distribute special education funds to school districts based on the numbers of
students they identify for special education are less associated with
overrepresentation of minorities than per-capita formulas are.310 The reporting
and early intervening services spending requirements recently put into place by
Congress may also prove beneficial.311 Nevertheless, strict proportionality of
representation by race is likely to remain an unrealistic goal, if only because of
the real, if sometimes overstated, contribution of poverty to disability. One
prominent critic of overrepresentation concedes that “in high-poverty districts,
strict numeric proportionality may mean that some children in need are not
receiving services.”312
D. Summary
The law of eligibility under IDEA is indeed a mess. The recent caselaw is
frequently unhelpful, and sometimes it is downright harmful in that it keeps
children Congress intended to benefit from the law from receiving the law’s
benefits. The RTI movement holds promise for students who have learning
disabilities, but there are many unanswered questions and perhaps some
unanswerable ones in extending RTI methodology as far as is being proposed.
Finally, there is an air of racial discrimination in the way African Americans are
treated in the special education system, including eligibility and placement
determinations, just as there is in the way African Americans are treated in the
educational system in general. What is to be done?
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Garda, supra note 12, at 1083. Professor Garda further notes that “One final explanation for
African-American students’ poor outcomes from special education is that eligible AfricanAmerican children are more likely than their white counterparts to be placed in restrictive,
segregated settings apart from general education students and the general curriculum.” Id. at
1085.
310
Thomas Parrish, Racial Disparities in the Identification, Funding, and Provision of Special
Education, in RACIAL INEQUITY IN SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra note 48, at 15, 16.
311
See generally supra text accompanying notes 279-82 (describing recent statutory initiatives
addressing disparities). Garda remains skeptical. See Garda, supra note 12, at 1100-01.
312
Thomas Hehir, IDEA and Disproportionality: Federal Enforcement, Effective Advocacy, and
Strategies for Change, in RACIAL INEQUITY IN SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra note 48, at 219, 235.
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IV. THE CLEANUP
I have already hinted at some of the steps that might be needed—or at
least some of those that must be avoided—if the problems with the law of special
education eligibility are to be resolved. What needs to be done includes rectifying
the caselaw, moving cautiously on RTI, and addressing the problems raised by
racial overrepresentation not as problems of IDEA eligibility, but as problems in
connection with what happens once a child is IDEA eligible.
A. Reforming the Caselaw on Eligibility
The solution to the problems posed by the caselaw does not lie in
changing the three-part eligibility definition. Except for the difficulty with the
social maladjustment category, which can be fixed in other ways, the first part,
which includes the disability classifications themselves,313 poses little difficulty.
The second part, the “adversely affects educational performance” term found in
all but the learning disability definition,314 is also not problematic as long as it is
read in its federally-minted, unadorned form. There is no basis to transform it
into “significantly affects educational performance” or the equivalent. Using state
rules or policies to do so violates the supremacy of federal law by defining out of
a federal statute’s coverage many of the children the federal law protects. The
same point applies with regard to the third term, “by reason thereof, needs special
education and related services.”315 Putting a restrictive reading on this term,
whether one based in state law or plucked from a school district’s pleadings,
undermines the goals of IDEA to serve all children with disabilities, not some
imaginary subset of children who cannot be educated in a general education
classroom even with accommodations and supports.316 Special education consists
of those accommodations and supports,317 and federal law favors delivering the
accommodations and supports in the general education classroom.318 All children
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20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (West 2008); 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c) (2008).
34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c).
315
20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)(A)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(a).
316
As noted, the original title of the federal statute was the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act. Even now, the first statement of purposes in the legislation reads: “The purposes of
this title are—to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate
public education . . . .” 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(d)(1)(A).
317
See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)(A)(ii) (“The term ‘special education’ means specially designed
instruction, at no cost to parents, to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability, including—
(A) instruction conducted in the classroom, in the home, in hospitals and institutions, and in other
settings; and (B) instruction in physical education.”); 34 C.F.R. § 300.39(a) (2008) (“Special
education means specially designed instruction, at no cost to the parents, to meet the unique needs
of a child with a disability . . . .”).
318
20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (“[S]pecial classes, separate schooling, or other removal of
children with disabilities from the regular educational environment [may] occur[] only when the
nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with the use
of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.”).
314
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who require “specially designed instruction to meet [their] unique needs”319 and
“aids, services, and other supports”320 because of one of the conditions listed in
the IDEA definition need special education and related services by reason thereof,
and are IDEA-eligible. The courts should appreciate Professor Hensel’s insight
that they are being led on a misguided search for the “truly disabled,” a search
that IDEA does not require, but that instead threatens to undermine the goals of
the statute.321
There is a paradox in the fact that school districts fight over the eligibility
of children such as those in the Hood,322 A.D.,323 and Mr. I.324 cases. If the
children are not eligible, the school districts cannot use federal funds to serve
them. Depending on the funding formula the state employs, the district will likely
not be able to claim as much state reimbursement as it otherwise would if the
children are excluded from the count of eligible children.325 Yet the schools still
deny eligibility and literally make a federal case out of it when the parents object.
Perhaps the local school districts are responding to state education department
regulators who are eager to decrease the number of special education children by
any means possible. More likely, the school districts, even though they claim to
be willing to provide services through other mechanisms, are unwilling to extend
to these children the legal entitlement to services, complete with the procedural
and discipline protections needed to put the entitlement into force. It may be
more convenient to serve or not serve as the school district chooses, and to be free
of statutory notice, hearing, and continuation-of-services requirements. But when
that convenience is purchased at a price of distorting the terms of the federal law,
the courts should step in.
As for other matters raised by the caselaw, the reach of Rowley326 should
be limited to its definition-of-appropriate-education context (as argued below, for
other reasons its reach ought to be restricted still further). Social maladjustment is
not a distinct category from emotional disturbance. An amendment to the federal
regulations to eliminate the sentence containing the social maladjustment term
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20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(29).
20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(33) (West 2008). This extends to “aids, services, and supports that are
provided in regular education classes or other education-related settings.” Id.
321
See Hensel, supra note 10., at 1180 (discussed supra text accompanying notes 175-79); see
also supra text accompanying note 316 (emphasizing need to serve “all children”).
322
Hood v. Encinitas Union Sch. Dist., 486 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2007).
323
Alvin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. A.D. , 503 F.3d 378 (5th Cir. 2007).
324
Mr. I. v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 55, 480 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007).
325
See generally supra text accompanying notes 47-48 (discussing state special education
funding).
326
Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
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would be welcome,327 but if that does not happen, the courts should look to the
definition of emotional disturbance itself and not treat social maladjustment as an
exclusion to that definition.
B. Learning Disabilities and Response to Intervention
What about RTI? RTI is too promising an innovation to squelch, but the
problems of implementing it on a grand scale are too overwhelming to permit an
unqualified endorsement. It should be rolled out as a method to handle suspected
difficulties in reading mechanics for children in the early grades. It should be
extended to other suspected disabilities and to older children only as the research
base justifies. If parents of a high-achieving child demand the child’s evaluation,
discrepancy methods should be used. Precisely when notice and other procedural
rights kick in may be unclear under present law, but as a matter of policy it would
make sense to afford full-fledged IDEA notice to parents of all children selected
for specialized intervention under an RTI program. It would also be desirable,
and under a sensible interpretation of the law it should be required, to make an
eligibility determination within the applicable timeline from the beginning of
selection for RTI services, unless the parents agree to an extension of time. The
lapse of the timeline does not mean that RTI services should stop, but simply that
the services should be considered special education if the child meets eligibility
standards based on the information gathered to that point and the parents consent
to the services. RTI must not become a means to avoid or delay providing IDEA
procedural and disciplinary protections. In fact, there is good reason to believe
that much parental opposition to RTI would evaporate if school districts were to
bind themselves to afford IDEA or IDEA-like disciplinary protections to all
children placed in RTI programs. Even the best-case RTI scenario is unlikely to
eliminate all need for testing-based approaches to LD, however. More than one
means of evaluation must be used for eligibility determinations,328 and additional
means will need to be developed before testing can be abandoned.
C. Racial Overrepresentation and Related Issues
The problem of overrepresentation of African-Americans and other ethnic
groups in some high-incidence disability categories is vexing. The solution,
however, rests not with a redefinition of eligibility or with other mechanisms that
would keep children from gaining legal rights to specialized services. Although
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The Department of Education proposed dropping the term in 1982, but the change never made
it into the final regulation. See O’Neill, supra note 124, at 1202 (citing 47 Fed. Reg. 33836 (Aug.
4, 1982)).
328
20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1414(b)(2)(A) (West 2008) (requiring school district to “use a variety of
assessment tools and strategies”), 1414(b)(2)(B) (forbidding school district to “use any single
measure or assessment as the sole criterion for determining whether a child is a child with a
disability”); 34 C.F.R. § 300.306(c)(i) (2008) (requiring school district to “[d]raw upon
information from a variety of sources, including aptitude and achievement tests”) .
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non-special education services that compensate for educational disadvantage or
cultural isolation would be a good thing, they key to the overrepresentation
problem is to keep overrepresentation from being a problem. That is, the
potential harm from special education identification, chiefly the forced separation
of children into non-mainstream, low-expectation programs, needs to be fixed.
There are a number of remedies to be undertaken. One is to expand in-class
assistance through curricular adaptations and accommodations, whether these are
designated special education or something else.329 Another is to increase the
availability of after-school special education services delivered either at home or
elsewhere. Courts have edged towards the recognition that specialized programs
directed to enabling children to succeed in the mainstream are a less restrictive
educational option than placing a child in a self-contained special education class
in the public school, and so may be required irrespective of the fact that children
might still benefit educationally from fewer services in a self-contained setting.
For example, in L.B. v. Nebo School District, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that a young child with autism had to be kept in a private mainstream
preschool setting chosen by her parents, in which she had an aide to assist her,
and at the same time receive thirty-five to forty hours a week of applied
behavioral analysis services at home, outside of the school day.330 The court
rejected the school district’s proposal for a public preschool environment focusing
on special education (with a few nondisabled children also enrolled) and a lower
number of hours of applied behavioral analysis services delivered at the school.331
The court stressed that the extra hours of services at home permitted the child to
thrive in preschool, making her the most academically advanced child in her
mainstream class.332 Although the school district argued that the child would
receive some educational benefit with the lower amount of services, the court
applied the statutory mandate in favor of the least restrictive educational
environment, a duty not bounded by the Rowley some-benefit standard.333 If
school systems, prodded by courts, can break out of the six- to seven-hour school
day and set their sights on boosting the performance of children with disabilities
to academic excellence, a special education designation will be a benefit, not a
disadvantage.
This imperative suggests another, the need to improve special education
services in general. Numerous commentators have suggested that the Rowley case
was ill-considered334 or has been rendered obsolete by changes to the special
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In addition, state funding formulas that create financial incentives to overidentify should be
changed. See supra text accompanying note 45 (discussing incentives in funding formulas).
330
379 F.3d 966 (10th Cir. 2004).
331
Id. at 978.
332
Id. at 971.
333
See id. at 977-78.
334
See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, The Role of Cost in Decisionmaking for the Handicapped Child,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring, 1985, at 7, 47; Bonnie Poitras Tucker, Board of Education of
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education law in 1997 that stressed the goals of independence and selfsufficiency.335 Although courts continue to cite and rely on Rowley,336 they need
to recognize that its some-benefit standard does not govern questions such as
which services are needed for a child to be educated in the least restrictive
environment.337 They also need to understand that the No Child Left Behind
initiative, with its stress on bringing the achievement of all children up to state
grade-level standards, will inevitably affect what is considered appropriate
education under IDEA. One of the primary purposes of the 2004 IDEA
Reauthorization was to harmonize NCLB and IDEA.338 If the goal is to bring all
children up to grade level by 2014,339 education that fails to do so is hardly an
appropriate education for children with disabilities who could make grade level
performance with more intense programming.340 Indeed, it may be argued that

the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley: Utter Chaos, 12 J.L. & EDUC. 235
(1983).
335
See, e.g., Scott F. Johnson, Reexamining Rowley: A New Focus in Special Education Law,
2003 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 561, 574-75; Tara L. Eyer, Commentary, Greater Expectations: How
the 1997 IDEA Amendments Raise the Floor of Opportunity for Children with Disabilities, 26
EDUC. L. REP. 1, 4-6 (1998).
336
See Julie F. Mead & Mark A. Paige, Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson v. Rowley: An
Examination of Its Precedential Impact, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 329, 329 (2008) (collecting cases)
(“Rowley stands firm as the primary precedent whenever the educational rights of children with
disabilities are considered.”).
337
See Mark C. Weber, The Least Restrictive Environment Obligation as an Entitlement to
Educational Services: A Commentary, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 147 (2001).
338
See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(c)(5)(C) (West 2008); Weber, supra note 23, at 16-21. One new IDEA
requirement, drawn from NCLB, is that a child’s statement of educational services and aids be
based on peer-reviewed research to the extent practicable. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV); 34
C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(4) (2008). This measure is designed to force school districts to use
educational methodology that is proven to succeed, and should affect the standard for appropriate
education. See Jean B. Crockett & Mitchell L. Yell, Without Data All We Have Are Assumptions:
Revisiting the Meaning of a Free Appropriate Public Education, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 381, 388 (2008)
(“The inclusion of this terminology may prove to be significant to future courts when interpreting
the [free, appropriate public education] mandate because the law directs IEP teams, when
developing a student's IEP, to base the special education services to be provided on reliable
evidence that the program or service works.”).
339
See 20 U.S.C.A. § 6311(a)(2)(F) (West 2008).
340
See Philip T.K. Daniel, “Some Benefit” or “Maximum Benefit”: Does the No Child Left Behind
Act Render Greater Educational Entitlement to Students with Disabilities, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 347,
354 (2008) (“NCLB makes it clear that, under federal law, students with disabilities are entitled to
and expected to meet the same high academic standards as non-disabled children. The standards
movement assumes that all students can achieve high levels of learning if they receive high
expectations, clearly defined standards, and effective teaching to support achievement. These high
expectations in state education standards, however, are at odds with the core holding in Rowley
that school districts only need to meet the minimalist ‘some educational benefit’ standard. The
shift from process to outcome, which is at the heart of the standards-based movement, also
contradicts the Rowley finding that the purpose of the IDEA is to provide access to education. The
movement's emphasis on content and proficiency focuses on what students actually learn . . . .”);
see also Dixie Snow Huefner, Updating the FAPE Standard Under Rowley, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 367,
378 (2008) (“Under IDEA '04 the purpose of IDEA is no longer merely to provide ‘a basic floor of
opportunity.’ The expectation of academic and functional progress calls for more than a floor.”).
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anything less fails to comply with the federal definition of appropriate education
as that which “meet[s] the standards of the State educational agency.”341 NCLB’s
requirement that adequate yearly progress goals be met by subgroups that include
both minorities and students with disabilities342 may be the prime motivator for
schools to increase the intensity of services given to both African-American
children and children with disabilities. For this reason, whatever one’s general
opinion may be regarding standardized testing,343 the subgroup focus of NCLB
needs to be maintained.344
Will the stigma of disability remain, particularly the stigma associated
with learning disability or emotional disturbance? Perhaps. Attitudes of the
majority with regard to race or disability, and, particularly, race and disability, do
not change easily. For the present and for the foreseeable future, schools will
need to take aggressive steps to educate children without disabilities that
harassment is wrong and will be met with stern disciplinary action.345 Courts
must be ready to provide remedies when schools fail to do what they should.

CONCLUSION
At the present time, there does not appear to be an adequate justification
for eliminating eligibility requirements altogether.346 Other programs may prove
successful with children whose problems do not stem from disability. Moreover,
federal dollars for the education of children with disabilities should fund
But see Mr. C. v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 6, 538 F. Supp. 2d 298, 300-01 (D. Me. 2008)
(rejecting argument that amendments to IDEA in 2004 altered appropriate education standard).
341
See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(9)(B). Children with severe cognitive disabilities will not be able to
meet grade-level standards, particularly in the upper grades, but NCLB allows for this fact by
allowing a small percentage of children to count towards the total of children meeting proficiency
standards based on alternate educational assessments. 34 C.F.R. § 200.13(c)(ii) (2008). See
generally Michelle Croft, Note, Modified Assessments and No Child Left Behind: Beneficial to
Students with Disabilities But Potential Problems in Implementation, 11 J. GENDER RACE & JUST.
513 (2008) (discussing alternate educational assessments).
342
20 U.S.C.A. § 6311(a)(2)(C)(v)(II).
343
See Weber, supra note 23, at 19-21 (noting criticisms of NCLB testing regimen, particularly
regarding children with disabilities).
344
NCLB requires that certain subgroups of children, including children with disabilities, show
adequate yearly progress in meeting proficiency standards, just as the progress must be shown by
the group of children in the school as a whole and the children in each school. 20 U.S.C.A. §
6311(a)(2)(C)(v)(II)(cc).
345
See Weber, supra note 300, at 1155 & n.382 (listing voluntary action that school districts
should take to combat harassment of students with disabilities); see also Paul M. Secunda, At the
Crossroads of Title IX and a New “IDEA”: Why Bullying Need Not Be “A Normal Part of
Growing Up” for Special Education Children, 12 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1 (2005)
(discussing legal remedies for bullying of children with disabilities) .
346
Some have suggested that the entitlements to an appropriate education should apply to all
children. See, e.g., Terry Jean Seligmann, supra note 183, at 761 (“A focus on the individual
child’s needs, parental involvement, enforceable rights, and a range of services should be part of
every school child’s life, not only those designated as special.”).
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education of children with disabilities, not be directed to other social priorities.
Nevertheless, the move towards broader disabilities categories is to be applauded,
and there is much to be said for the extension of a legal entitlement to appropriate
services for children without disabilities who are the public school system’s
“instructional casualties.” The latter development will need to await a political
movement comparable to the one that led to the special education entitlement
embodied in the 1975 Education for All Handicapped Children Act.
There are measures, however, that should be taken to reform special
education eligibility and clean up the eligibility mess that the courts and others
have created. The steps to do so are largely straightforward and do not require
legislative intervention. They simply require courts and schools to follow the
letter and spirit of the special education law.
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